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Arctic Energy Cooperation 
Hari M. Osofsky,†* Jessica Shadian** & Sara L. Fechtelkotter*** 
The Arctic — with almost a third of the world’s remaining natural gas 
and thirteen percent of its oil — is one of the globe’s last frontiers for 
competition over unexplored natural resources. The rapid pace of Arctic 
melting due to climate change has created opportunities to extract the 
region’s previously inaccessible offshore oil and gas. The 2015 controversy 
over the Obama Administration’s approval of Shell Oil’s drilling in the 
Chukchi Sea followed by the company’s decision to pull out highlighted the 
need for clear and effective regulation of Arctic drilling. Offshore oil spills 
are difficult to prevent and clean up, as showcased by the BP Deepwater 
Horizon accident — which occurred in an environment not plagued by 
Arctic ice and weather extremes. The complexity and fragmentation of 
existing governance arrangements further complicate matters. Numerous 
public and private entities are currently developing standards for Arctic 
drilling and spill response as new projects and accidents highlight the 
urgency of addressing risks. 
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This Article makes a novel proposal for addressing these challenges 
through what it terms “hybrid cooperation.” In this form of cooperation, 
diverse public and private stakeholders at multiple governmental levels 
coordinate their efforts through either: (1) creating institutions or (2) 
integrating each other’s standards in agreements and regulations. The 
Article uses original case studies to assess the possibilities for hybrid 
cooperation to make Arctic drilling safer and to create more cohesive 
governance. It argues that this convergence of standards and stakeholders, 
while piecemeal, helps to develop norms for how to operate in the Arctic. 
More broadly, this concept of hybrid cooperation — which draws from 
and contributes to interdisciplinary scholarship on hybrid governance — 
can shed light on governance challenges in other areas, such as 
humanitarian crisis management, transnational investment, climate 
change, and whaling. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In July 2015, Shell Oil received a controversial final approval from 
the Obama Administration for its Arctic offshore drilling project in the 
Chukchi Sea.1 Less than three months later, Shell Oil announced that 
it was suspending its offshore Arctic oil and gas exploration for the 
foreseeable future.2 Although the company faced significant public 
pressure over its decision to drill in the Arctic, its decision to 
withdraw appears to have been largely financial; the exploration well 
contained insufficient oil and gas to justify continued drilling at a time 
when oil prices are low and regulations are evolving.3 As 
environmental groups cheered, Alaska Natives had a more mixed 
response. Some Inupiat leaders highlighted the risks to the delicate 
 
 1 Shell announced in early 2015 that it intended to start Arctic oil drilling that 
summer in the Chukchi Sea, a portion of the Arctic Ocean located between Alaska and 
Siberia. See Terry Macalister & Damian Carrington, Shell Determined to Start Arctic Oil 
Drilling This Summer, GUARDIAN (Jan. 29, 2015, 12:52 PM), 
http://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/jan/29/shell-determined-arctic-oil-drilling-
summer. The Obama Administration conditionally approved the drilling. Joby Warrick, 
One Step Closer to Arctic Drilling? Obama Administration Grants Shell “Conditional” 
Approval, WASH. POST (May 11, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-
environment/wp/2015/05/11/one-step-closer-to-arctic-drilling-obama-administration-
grants-shell-conditional-approval. However, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service put 
restrictions on well spacing that prevent Shell Oil’s implementation of its initial plan. See 
Timothy Gardner, UPDATE 2 — U.S. Walrus Protections Hit Shell’s Arctic Drilling Plan, 
REUTERS (June 30, 2015, 11:53 PM), http://uk.reuters.com/article/2015/06/30/usa-shell-
arctic-idUKL1N0ZG2QT20150630. Shell received final regulatory approval to drill the two 
exploration wells in July 2015, but with constraints regarding depth and ice unless Shell 
could repair its ice-breaking vessel. See Steven Mufson, Obama Administration Greenlights 
Shell Drilling off Alaska’s Arctic Coast, WASH. POST (July 22, 2015), http://www. 
washingtonpost.com/news/energy-environment/wp/2015/07/22/obama-administration-
greenlights-shell-drilling-off-alaskas-arctic-coast. The ice-breaking vessel reached the site 
by August 2015 despite efforts by Greenpeace protestors to block it. See Karl Mathieson, 
Shell Ready to Begin Drilling for Oil in the Arctic, GUARDIAN (Aug. 11, 2015, 7:15 AM), 
http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/aug/11/shell-ready-to-begin-drilling-for-
oil-in-arctic. 
 2 See Shell Updates on Alaska Exploration, SHELL GLOBAL (Sept. 28, 2015), 
http://www.shell.com/global/aboutshell/media/news-and-media-releases/2015/shell-
updates-on-alaska-exploration.html. 
 3 See Sarah Kent, Shell to Cease Oil Exploration in Alaskan Arctic After Disappointing 
Drilling Season, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 28, 2015, 7:51 PM), http://www. 
wsj.com/articles/shell-to-cease-oil-exploration-offshore-alaska-1443419673; Shell Updates 
on Alaska Exploration, supra note 2. 
  
1434 University of California, Davis [Vol. 49:1431 
ecological environment, while others worried about the economic 
repercussions; Alaska Native corporations were co-invested with Shell 
Oil in the Chukchi Sea and the industry brings jobs and resources to 
coastal communities.4 
However, the Shell Oil venture — despite all the controversy and 
publicity — was just one among several planned and potential Arctic 
offshore drilling projects in the five coastal Arctic nations’ waters. Just 
a few days before Shell Oil announced the pullout, Hilcorp Alaska, 
LLC filed a Development and Production Plan (“DPP”) for its Liberty 
Prospect oil and gas project in the Beaufort Sea with the U.S. Bureau of 
Ocean Energy Management.5 The agency is proceeding with its review 
of that project.6 Moreover, U.S. activities occur in a broader Arctic 
drilling context. Despite low oil and natural gas prices and public 
pressure around climate change and oil spill risks that have resulted in 
a number of oil companies shelving offshore projects in the Canadian 
and Russian Arctic for the time being, Norwegian and Italian 
companies continue with projects in the Barents Sea and Russian 
Gazprom moves toward production in the Pechora Sea.7 
The high profile Shell Oil approval and pullout also paralleled 
important regulatory developments that reinforced both the growing 
U.S. legal focus on and ever-shifting politics and economics of Arctic 
offshore oil and gas. In February 2015, the Obama Administration 
issued new Arctic-specific regulations for exploratory offshore drilling.8 
Two months later, the United States began its two-year term as chair of 
the Arctic Council — “the preeminent intergovernmental forum for 
 
 4 See Julia O’Malley, Alaska Divided as Shell Halts Arctic Drilling: Heartbreaking News 
or a Miracle?, GUARDIAN (Sept. 29, 2015, 1:19 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2015/sep/29/alaska-shell-offshore-oil-drilling-reaction-natives; infra Part III.C.1. 
 5 See Hilcorp Alaska LLC: About the Liberty Project, BUREAU OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., 
http://www.boem.gov/Hilcorp-Liberty (last visited Feb. 20, 2016); Hilcorp Submits 
Development Plan for Liberty Prospect, Offshore Alaska, WORLD OIL (Sept. 21, 2015), 
http://www.worldoil.com/news/2015/9/21/hilcorp-submits-development-plan-for-liberty-
prospect-offshore-alaska. 
 6 Hilcorp Alaska LLC: About the Liberty Project, supra note 5. 
 7 See Kent, supra note 3; Chris Mooney, Following in Shell’s Footsteps, Oil Major Statoil 
Will Also Exit the Alaskan Arctic, WASH. POST (Nov. 17, 2015), https:// 
www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-environment/wp/2015/11/17/following-in-shells-
footsteps-oil-major-statoil-will-also-exit-the-alaskan-arctic. 
 8 See Oil and Gas and Sulphur Operations on the Outer Continental Shelf — 
Requirements for Exploratory Drilling on the Arctic Outer Continental Shelf, 80 Fed. 
Reg. 9916 (proposed Feb. 24, 2015) (to be codified at 30 C.F.R. 250, 254, 550) 
[hereinafter Arctic Drilling Rule], available at http://www.bsee.gov/uploadedFiles/ 
Proposed%20Arctic%20Drilling%20Rule.pdf. 
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addressing issues related to the Arctic Region”9 — and specifically 
referenced “oil pollution preparedness and response” among its 
program highlights.10 However, in October 2015, shortly after Shell 
Oil’s announced withdrawal, the Obama Administration announced that 
it was canceling two lease sales scheduled for 2016 and 2017 in the 
Chukchi and Beaufort Seas in response to Shell Oil’s decision and the 
lack of industry nomination of specific exploration areas.11 
Even as Alaskan offshore drilling appears to be slowing in the short 
term, the U.S. and global focus on the tumultuous Arctic offshore oil 
and gas industry is warranted because our global energy future 
depends on how we manage these resources. The region contains 
roughly 30% of global undiscovered, technically recoverable gas — 
which has not yet been found but could plausibly be retrieved — and 
13% of such oil.12 Most of this oil and gas can only be accessed 
through complex offshore drilling techniques; approximately 80% of 
Arctic energy resources are located below a sea that is ice covered 
much of the year.13 
Climate change has made the question of how we regulate these 
Arctic energy resources more urgent. The Arctic is warming at a faster 
rate than most of the rest of the world, with major implications for the 
sea ice that has historically limited access to the Arctic Ocean, its seas, 
and its resources.14 The expanding open water creates prospects for 
 
 9 Arctic Council, U.S. DEP’T ST., http://www.state.gov/e/oes/ocns/opa/arc/ac (last 
visited Feb. 20, 2016). 
 10 U.S. ARCTIC COUNCIL TEAM, ONE ARCTIC: ARCTIC COUNCIL, U.S. CHAIRMANSHIP 
2015–17 (2015), available at https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/bitstream/handle/ 
11374/943/2015-09-01_US_Chairmanship_Brochure_2015-2017.pdf.  
 11 See Chris Mooney, In a Major Setback for Arctic Drilling, the Obama Administration 
Cancels Two Oil Lease Sales, WASH. POST (Oct. 16, 2015), http://www. 
washingtonpost.com/news/energy-environment/wp/2015/10/16/oil-drilling-in-the-arctic-
just-received-another-major-setback. 
 12 See CHARLES EBINGER ET AL., OFFSHORE OIL AND GAS GOVERNANCE IN THE ARCTIC: A 
LEADERSHIP ROLE FOR THE U.S. 6 (Mar. 2014), available at http://www. 
brookings.edu/~/media/Research/Files/Reports/2014/03/offshore-oil-gas-governance-arctic/ 
Offshore-Oil-and-Gas-Governance-text-revised.pdf.  
 13 See id. 
 14 See SUSAN JOY HASSOL, ARCTIC CLIMATE IMPACT ASSESSMENT, IMPACTS OF A 
WARMING ARCTIC: ARCTIC CLIMATE IMPACT ASSESSMENT 8 (2004), available at 
http://www.amap.no/documents/download/1058; JOAN NYMAND LARSEN ET AL., Polar 
Regions, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2014: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY 1567, 
1570-85, 1587-93 (Maria Ananicheva & F. Stuart Chapin III eds., 2014), available at 
http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar5/wg2/WGIIAR5-Chap28_FINAL.pdf. 
Minimum summer sea ice in 2012 was 49% below the 1979 to 2000 average and 18% 
below 2007. See Arctic Sea Ice Extent Settles at Record Seasonal Minimum, NAT’L SNOW 
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commercial shipping and oil and gas exploration in places that were 
previously inaccessible.15 Even with less summer sea ice, however, 
conditions remain harsh, making offshore drilling risky.16 During its 
most accessible period, many parts of the Arctic Ocean and its seas 
(particularly North American waters) continue to experience rough 
conditions, very cold temperatures, strong winds, fog, and floating 
ice.17 The Arctic summer is also short, only three to four months, with 
ice covering the ocean during the rest of the year and continuous 
darkness in the winter months.18 
The 2010 BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill — much farther south in 
the Gulf of Mexico — reinforced the dangers of offshore drilling; oil 
flowed for 87 days, resulting in approximately 4.9 million barrels of 
oil being discharged, with ongoing significant impacts on the 
ecosystem and Gulf communities.19 Although that spill took place in 
the less pristine Gulf environment with its easier accessibility for 
cleanup (though in much deeper water than current Arctic projects), 
stopping the spill and addressing the waste posed formidable 
barriers.20 Extraction and spill recovery in Arctic conditions are far 
more difficult, and spills could have disastrous effects on the Arctic’s 
unique ecosystem and the Alaska Natives who rely on it.21 
Addressing these physical challenges adequately is made more 
challenging by the complexity and fragmentation of relevant existing 
governance arrangements. The United Nations Convention on the Law 
 
& ICE DATA CTR. (Sept. 19, 2012), http://nsidc.org/arcticseaicenews/2012/09/arctic-
sea-ice-extent-settles-at-record-seasonal-minimum. 
 15 See EBINGER ET AL., supra note 12, at xv. 
 16 See Arctic Standards: Recommendations on Oil Spill Prevention, Response, and Safety, 
PEW CHARITABLE TR. (Sept. 23, 2013), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-
analysis/reports/2013/09/23/arctic-standards-recommendations-on-oil-spill-prevention-
response-and-safety. 
 17 See id. 
 18 See id. 
 19 See NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL AND OFFSHORE DRILLING, 
DEEP WATER: THE GULF OIL DISASTER AND THE FUTURE OF OFFSHORE DRILLING 129, 165, 167-
68, 173-78, 180-82 (2011); NAT’L WILDLIFE FED’N, FIVE YEARS AND COUNTING: GULF 
WILDLIFE IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE DEEPWATER HORIZON DISASTER 3-22 (2015), 
http://www.nwf.org/~/media/PDFs/water/2015/Gulf-Wildlife-In-the-Aftermath-of-the-
Deepwater-Horizon-Disaster_Five-Years-and-Counting.pdf. 
 20 See NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL AND OFFSHORE 
DRILLING, supra note 19, at 90-92. 
 21 See EBINGER ET AL., supra note 12, at xv, 38; Arctic Standards: Recommendations 
on Oil Spill Prevention, Response, and Safety, supra note 16. 
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of the Sea (UNCLOS)22 helps to resolve land disputes among Arctic 
nation-states crucial to establishing resource rights to drill.23 However, 
in the context of offshore drilling safety, the Arctic Council has been 
the most significant supranational regional entity developing 
international cooperation.24 The Arctic Council is governed through a 
consensus-based decision-making process among the eight Arctic 
states and six organizations representing indigenous peoples, with 
other governmental and nongovernmental entities serving as 
observers.25 Its six working groups provide opportunities for public 
and private stakeholders to give input into key Arctic policy issues;26 
the Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment (“PAME”) working 
group in particular has helped develop guidelines for offshore drilling 
safety.27 The Arctic Council largely secures each nation’s compliance 
with soft law norms rather than hard rules, but more recent 
agreements negotiated in this context under its auspices have had 
binding force and have been integrated into domestic regulation. For 
example, as discussed in more depth below, the new U.S. regulations 
 
 22 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 
U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS]. 
 23 In the 2008 Ilulissat Declaration, the five coastal Arctic nations, including the 
United States, recognized that the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(“UNCLOS”) “provides for important rights and obligations concerning the 
delineation of the outer limits of the continental shelf, the protection of the marine 
environment, including ice-covered areas, freedom of navigation, marine scientific 
research, and other uses of the sea.” The Ilulissat Declaration, U.S.-Can.-Den.-Nor.-
Russ., May 28, 2008, available at https://www.regjeringen.no/globalassets/ 
upload/ud/080525_arctic_ocean_conference-_outcome.pdf. However, the United 
States is not a party to UNCLOS and interacts with it by treating it as customary 
international law. See Chapter XXI Law of the Sea, UNITED NATIONS TREATY 
COLLECTION, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetailsIII.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_ 
no=XXI-6&chapter=21&Temp=mtdsg3&lang=en (last visited Feb. 17, 2016); What Is 
the Law of the Sea?, NOAA, http://oceanservice.noaa.gov/facts/lawofsea.html (last 
visited Mar. 28, 2016). See generally John A. Duff, The United States and the Law of the 
Sea Convention: Sliding Back from Accession and Ratification, 11 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 
1, 10 (2006) (discussing the U.S. relationship with UNCLOS); Commander Robert C. 
“Rock” De Tolve, JAGC, USN, At What Cost: American’s Failure to Ratify UNCLOS at a 
Time of “Lawfare”, 61 NAVAL L. REV. 1 (2012) (analyzing the longstanding U.S. debates 
over ratification and the national security questions raised by its failure to ratify 
UNCLOS). 
 24 For an in-depth description of Arctic Council governance, see infra Part II.B. 
 25 See id. 
 26 See id. 
 27 See New Guidelines from PAME on Arctic Oil and Gas Safety Management, ARCTIC 
COUNCIL (May 22, 2014), http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/our-work2/8-news-
and-events/236-new-guidelines-from-pame-on-arctic-oil-and-gas-safety-management.  
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on Arctic offshore drilling incorporate the Arctic Council’s Agreement 
on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response 
in the Arctic.28 
The Arctic Council’s initiatives, though, occur in conjunction with 
other relevant multilateral and bilateral agreements, efforts by 
standard-setting and trade organizations to address technical aspects 
of drilling safety, and governance arrangements involving the Arctic’s 
indigenous peoples.29 Furthermore, the domestic-international 
interface and relevant domestic law is also complex. When the United 
States began its term as chair of the Arctic Council in Spring 2015, for 
instance, that nation-state was represented by a different federal 
agency in each of the Council’s six working groups.30 In addition, the 
United States, like other Arctic member states, has a complicated array 
of domestic law applicable to drilling safety and spill clean up, 
including the Arctic-specific regulations proposed in spring 2015.31 
The BP Deepwater Horizon spill highlighted the difficulties of 
coordinating clean up among the federal agencies, state and local 
government, and companies involved,32 and these issues would be 
magnified in the Arctic because of the greater likelihood of a spill 
crossing international boundaries.33 
This Article is the first to examine the possibilities for addressing 
these regulatory and governance challenges through what it terms 
“hybrid cooperation.”34 In this form of cooperation, diverse 
 
 28 See infra Part III.B.2. 
 29 See infra Parts II.C, II.D. 
 30 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, ARCTIC ISSUES: BETTER DIRECTION AND 
MANAGEMENT OF VOLUNTARY RECOMMENDATIONS COULD ENHANCE U.S. ARCTIC COUNCIL 
PARTICIPATION 23 fig.5 (2014). 
 31 See infra Part II.E. 
 32 For an in-depth exploration of these governance complexities, see Hari M. 
Osofsky, Multidimensional Governance and the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, 63 FLA. 
L. REV 1077, 1082-99 (2011) [hereinafter Multidimensional Governance]. 
 33 See Arctic Standards: Recommendations on Oil Spill Prevention, Response, and 
Safety, supra note 16. 
 34 The term “hybrid cooperation” has been used to refer to a consortium of 
companies working on hybrid vehicle technology. See Jeff Nisewanger, Revenge of the 
Two-Mode Hybrid, HYBRID CARS (Nov. 5, 2015), http://www.hybridcars.com/revenge-
of-the-two-mode-hybrid. However, an SSRN search on May 15, 2015 revealed no 
articles using “hybrid cooperation” (“No results for Abstracts with title, content, 
keywords or author containing ‘hybrid cooperation.’”), and a title search for “hybrid 
cooperation” in secondary sources on Westlaw on May 16, 2015 revealed only one. 
The one article used it in the context of the Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement 
and Reform Act of 2004 to refer to “a form of cooperation less than required under 
ACPERA but more than would be permitted under a stay,” and so has a very different 
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stakeholders at multiple levels of government intertwine their efforts 
through either (1) creating institutions that bring them together or (2) 
integrating each other’s work in the agreements and regulations that 
they develop.35 For example, prior to the Shell Oil pullout, that 
company and Alaska Native corporations entered into a new venture 
to collaborate in Arctic offshore drilling. The federal government has 
formed subnational multi-stakeholder groups around oil spill safety 
and waterway transport issues. Both the Arctic Council and U.S. 
government are incorporating standards from industry organizations 
or standard setting bodies.36 Although existing scholarship and reports 
have identified some of these structures, none has considered how this 
approach to governance provides opportunities for and barriers to 
more systematic disaster prevention and management.37 
This Article fills that gap. It analyzes the drivers of unconventional 
energy development in the Arctic, existing hybrid governance 
arrangements, and models for further cooperation embedded in them. 
In so doing, the Article focuses on the crucial question of how this 
governance innovation might translate into the creation of a regional 
Arctic offshore oil and gas governance system that can prevent and 
respond to oil spills more effectively. 
Part I provides the context for the rest of the Article’s analysis of 
governance. It describes the Arctic’s rich hydrocarbon energy 
resources and global demand for them, the role of climate change in 
making them more accessible, and the ways in which technological 
developments in deep water drilling and hydraulic fracturing — paired 
with disaster response — have influenced the broader market and 
regulatory context. 
Part II analyzes the multi-level law pertaining to and institutions 
working on Arctic unconventional energy, with a particular focus on 
the United States as a key example. It provides an in-depth analysis of 
the international (including Arctic regional) agreements and entities 
relevant to Arctic unconventional energy and their interaction with 
 
usage than in this article. Michael D. Hausfeld et al., Observations from the Field: 
ACPERA’s First Five Years, 10 SEDONA CONF. J. 95, 113 (2009). 
 35 See infra Part III.A. 
 36 See infra Parts III.B, III.C. 
 37 For example, EBINGER ET AL., supra note 12, at 22, 26, 28, and Edward T. 
Canuel, The Four Arctic Law Pillars: A Legal Framework, 46 GEO. J. INT’L L. 735, 739-
42, 747 (2015) provide thoughtful discussions of some of the complex multi-level 
governance dynamics and institutions described in Part II of this Article, but do not 
examine how emerging hybrid cooperation might help to address these governance 
concerns.  
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transnational industry and standard-setting entities, indigenous 
peoples, and U.S. domestic law. 
Part III provides a novel conceptual model of “hybrid cooperation” 
— which draws from and contributes to interdisciplinary scholarship 
on hybrid governance — and then examines six case examples of 
cooperation currently taking place. It focuses in particular on 
innovative regulatory and institutional developments that together 
demonstrate emerging cooperation. After analyzing these examples, it 
assesses the benefits and limitations of hybrid cooperation in the 
Arctic offshore drilling context. 
The Article concludes by examining the role of these instances of 
hybrid cooperation in building a multi-stakeholder regional 
governance approach to offshore oil and gas. It then considers how 
this model could be applied in other contexts — like transnational 
investment, humanitarian intervention, and climate change — in 
which many stakeholders have initiated overlapping, fragmented 
regulatory efforts. 
I. DRIVERS OF ARCTIC ENERGY DEVELOPMENT 
Although there has long been interest in the possibilities of massive 
energy resources under the Arctic ice,38 accessing them has only 
recently become more realistic.39 The confluence of climate change 
melting the ice barrier part of the year with recent developments in 
extraction technology have made offshore Arctic drilling possible 
(though still very difficult).40 
This Part provides the context for the rest of the Article by 
explaining the ways in which physical, market, and technological 
forces have converged to make the regulation of Arctic unconventional 
energy a pressing issue. It begins by analyzing the continuing high 
demand for fossil fuel resources and the pressure it creates to extract 
Arctic oil and gas. It then explores the ways in which climate change 
has made meeting this demand increasingly feasible. Finally, it 
discusses Arctic offshore drilling in the broader context of offshore 
drilling. It highlights the dramatic technological developments in 
offshore drilling and hydraulic fracturing that have opened up 
previously inaccessible oil and gas resources. It also considers the 
 
 38 See infra Part I.A. 
 39 See infra Part I.B. 
 40 See infra Parts I.B, I.C. 
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impact of BP Deepwater Horizon disaster on the industry and 
regulatory initiatives. 
A. Existence of Resources to Help Meet Demand 
Despite efforts to transition our primary sources of energy, 82% of 
U.S. primary energy consumption still comes from fossil fuels.41 Most 
relevant to Arctic resources, 36% of that consumption is of petroleum 
and 26% of that consumption is of natural gas.42 This high dependence 
on fossil fuels is replicated around the world.43 As of 2011, natural gas 
comprised 20.0% and oil comprised 47.8% of global energy 
consumption.44 These percentages reflect a rise in natural gas 
consumption and a fall in oil consumption over the last forty years.45 
This demand for fossil fuels generally, and oil and gas in particular, 
creates pressure to access more resources through offshore drilling. As 
noted in the introduction, a significant percentage of global 
undiscovered oil and gas is located in the Arctic.46 All five Arctic coastal 
states and Iceland have responded to national and global demand for oil 
and gas by beginning to explore how to access these offshore resources 
(or at least in what ways they can benefit from the resources to be 
found).47 As discussed in the following sections, their efforts have been 
aided by Arctic melting and technological developments, and hindered 
by the difficult physical environment and low natural gas prices due to 
the advent of hydraulic fracturing.48 Although the barriers may slow 
development, major investments and projects are underway and seem 
likely to expand in the coming decades.49 
 
 41 Total Energy: Energy Perspectives 1949–2011, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., 
http://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/annual/perspectives.cfm (last visited Feb. 21, 2016). 
 42 Id. 
 43 See INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, 2013 KEY WORLD ENERGY STATISTICS 29 (2013), available 
at http://www.energiatalgud.ee/img_auth.php/e/ef/IEA._Key_World_Energy_Statistics._ 
2013.pdf.  
 44 Id.  
 45 Id. 
 46 See EBINGER ET AL., supra note 12, at 5. 
 47 See EBINGER ET AL., supra note 12, at xv; Beth Gardiner, Iceland Aims to Seize 
Opportunities in Oil Exploration, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 1, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2013/10/02/business/energy-environment/iceland-aims-to-seize-opportunities-in-oil-
exploration.html. 
 48 See infra Parts I.B, I.C. 
 49 EBINGER ET AL., supra note 12, at x. 
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B. Accessibility Through Climate Change 
The Arctic has already been experiencing major physical impacts 
due to climate change. The U.S. Interagency Working Group on 
Coordination of Domestic Energy Development and Permitting in 
Alaska indicated in a 2013 report to the president that: 
The Arctic is warming faster than any other region on Earth, 
bringing dramatic reductions in sea ice extent, altered weather, 
and thawing permafrost. Implications of these changes include 
rapid coastal erosion threatening villages and facilities, loss of 
wildlife habitat, ecosystem instability, increased greenhouse-
gas emissions from melting permafrost, and unpredictable 
impacts on subsistence activities and critical social needs. 
In addition to elevating the already high level of uncertainty 
associated with resource management in the region, changes 
such as reduced sea ice are increasing interest in economic 
opportunities such as offshore oil and gas development and 
increased shipping through the region. The likelihood of 
increased human activity in this environmentally sensitive 
region has implications for managing a U.S. Arctic that 
currently lacks much of the costly infrastructure necessary to 
monitor and control the impacts of such activities.50 
Most relevant to accessing offshore energy resources, the dramatic 
declines in summer sea ice have created access for drilling. Multi-year 
sea ice, which stabilizes the Arctic ice pack, has declined by half since 
2005, and the polar ice cap has shrunk 40% since 1979. The 2012 
summer sea ice covered half the area that it did in 2000.51 The extent 
of annual season melt is extensive; for example, 4.57 million miles of 
sea ice melted between March and September in 2012.52 
Although summer melting has made new hydrocarbon exploration 
possible, accessing offshore Arctic oil and gas remains challenging and 
expensive. The Arctic Ocean still has ice cover for most of the year. 
Even during the summer months, cleaning up an oil spill would be 
 
 50 INTERAGENCY WORKING GRP. ON COORDINATION OF DOMESTIC ENERGY DEV. & 
PERMITTING IN ALASKA, MANAGING FOR THE FUTURE IN A RAPIDLY CHANGING ARCTIC: A 
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 1 (2013), available at http://www.afsc.noaa.gov/ 
Publications/misc_pdf/IAMreport.pdf. 
 51 See id. at 11; U.S. COAST GUARD, ARCTIC STRATEGY 18 (2013), available at 
http://www.uscg.mil/seniorleadership/DOCS/CG_Arctic_Strategy.pdf. 
 52 U.S. COAST GUARD, supra note 51. 
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much more difficult than in most other places where offshore drilling 
takes place.53 
The increased possibilities of Arctic oil exploration that climate 
change-induced melting brings paired with the enormous global 
demand for oil and gas makes a functional regulatory regime critical. 
Especially because the physical conditions increase the risks of 
already-difficult extraction under water, clear and coherent regulatory 
approaches are needed. 
C. Technological Development 
Although Arctic offshore drilling in the near term will take place in 
shallow waters, it occurs in the larger context of massive technological 
development driven by deepwater drilling and industry and 
governmental responses to the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill. Even in 
the comparatively easy-to-access Gulf of Mexico, deepwater drilling 
barely existed two decades ago and ultra-deepwater drilling has only 
emerged in the last decade, as the following figure indicates.54 
 
While these technological advances in drilling and safety will assist 
in the Arctic offshore oil and gas context, they also make regulation 
more difficult. The technology is changing so quickly that effective 
prescriptive regulation is hard. 
Moreover, at the same time as the capacity for deepwater drilling has 
expanded, hydraulic fracturing has also opened up previously 
inaccessible oil and gas reserves, an expansion that will likely 
 
 53 Arctic Standards: Recommendations on Oil Spill Prevention, Response, and Safety, 
supra note 16, at 14. 
 54 Production, Proved Reserves and Drilling in Ultra-Deepwater Gulf of Mexico, This 
Week in Petroleum, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (May 26, 2010), http://www.eia.gov/ 
petroleum/weekly/archive/2010/100526/twipprint.html. 
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continue. The U.S. Energy Information Administration’s 2015 Annual 
Energy Outlook indicates that U.S. dry natural gas production 
increased 35% from 2005 to 2013 largely due to shale gas resources. It 
projects a 73% increase in shale gas production in the lower 48 states 
from 2013 to 2040, which would result in a 45% increase in total U.S. 
dry natural gas production. The following figure from that report 
depicts the major expansion in shale gas over the past decade and 
projected future growth.55 
 
With respect to the Arctic in particular, there are shale formations 
onshore that may be accessible through hydraulic fracturing. 
However, the most significant impact thus far of hydraulic fracturing 
on Arctic unconventional energy development has been to stall 
offshore natural gas development projects. As a 2014 Brookings 
Energy Security Initiative Report notes, “the success of the 
unconventional oil and gas revolution in the lower 48 states has had a 
sobering effect on how soon energy resources in high-cost areas such 
as the Arctic will be developed.”56 Dropping oil prices in 2014 further 
undermined current offshore projects. For example, prior to the Shell 
Oil pullout described in the introduction, Chevron in December 2014 
 
 55 U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2015 WITH PROJECTIONS TO 
2040, at 1, 21, (Apr. 2015), available at http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/pdf/ 
0383(2015).pdf. Dry natural gas is “[n]atural gas which remains after: 1) the 
liquefiable hydrocarbon portion has been removed from the gas stream (i.e., gas after 
lease, field, and/or plant separation); and 2) any volumes of nonhydrocarbon gases 
have been removed where they occur in sufficient quantity to render the gas 
unmarketable.” Glossary: Natural Gas, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN, https://www.eia.gov/ 
tools/glossary/?id=natural%20gas (last visited Feb. 16, 2016). 
 56 EBINGER ET AL., supra note 12, at 7. 
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put drilling plans for Beaufort Sea in the Canadian Arctic “on hold 
indefinitely” due to “economic uncertainty in the industry.”57 
Although this slowdown in projects provides more breathing room 
for regulatory efforts, the longer-term picture likely involves increased 
Arctic offshore drilling unless a major transition in energy sources 
takes place. Even if physical challenges and lower oil and gas prices 
delay some of the exploratory efforts, demand for oil and gas and 
continuing melting will continue to create pressure to access these 
resources. Moreover, some projects are moving ahead even in the 
current economic environment. In the U.S. context, for example, as 
described in the Introduction, Hilcorp Alaska, LLC is continuing to 
proceed with exploration projects in the Beaufort Sea.58 And globally, 
Statoil is producing natural gas from the Barents Sea,59 Eni is nearing 
production of oil there,60 and Gazprom continues to move ahead in 
the Pechora Sea.61 
These developments make functional governance in this context 
important. However, as the following Part explores, Arctic energy 
governance is exceedingly complex and faces major challenges. 
Despite the efforts of numerous governmental and nongovernmental 
entities, a systematic and effective approach to Arctic offshore drilling 
energy has yet to emerge fully. 
II. EXISTING REGULATORY APPROACHES TO ARCTIC OFFSHORE OIL 
AND GAS 
Arctic offshore oil and gas exploration, on the surface, has a lot of law 
at multiple levels that applies to it. Treaties recognized by the Arctic 
Council member states address property rights to the Arctic Ocean 
subsurface and constrain pollution in those waters. National and 
subnational laws in each of the countries help to allocate property rights 
 
 57 Scott Haggett et al., Chevron Cancels Canadian Arctic Drilling as Oil Prices Slide, 
REUTERS (Dec. 17, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/12/17/us-chevron-
canada-artic-idUSKBN0JV2UU20141217. 
 58 See supra notes 5–6 and accompanying text. 
 59 Snøhvit, STATOIL, http://www.statoil.com/en/ouroperations/explorationprod/ncs/ 
snoehvit/pages/default.aspx (last visited Feb. 15, 2016). 
 60 See High Level of Activity at Goliat Field, ENI NORGE (June 18, 2015), 
http://www.eninorge.com/en/News—Media/News-Archive/2015/High-level-of-activity-
at-Goliat-field-/. 
 61 See Prirazlomnoye Oil Field, GAZPROM, http://www.gazprom.com/about/ 
production/projects/deposits/pnm (last visited Feb. 15, 2016); Prirazlomnove Oilfield 
— Russia, OFFSHORE-TECHNOLOGY.COM, http://www.offshore-technology.com/projects/ 
prirazlomnoye (last visited Feb. 15, 2016). 
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to the oil and gas and regulate exploration, drilling, and spill cleanup. 
The United States, in particular, has been developing new regulations 
for offshore drilling generally and in the Arctic context specifically. 
But this surface legal analysis masks the influence of a variety of 
stakeholders through mixed public-private arrangements. At a 
regional level, the Arctic Council — which involves not just the Arctic 
states but also indigenous peoples and, to an extent, other countries 
— plays a lead role in Arctic governance through its policy-shaping 
and, increasingly, policy-making efforts. The Arctic states have varying 
and complex domestic approaches to interacting with relevant 
international and regional legal structures. In addition, several 
transnational trade organizations have worked to establish industry 
standards around offshore drilling. Within most Arctic states, 
indigenous peoples have a variety of property rights and co-
management arrangements that will help shape how each country 
approaches oil and gas exploration. 
This Part traces the multi-level mix of law and more informal 
governance arrangements that shape current regulatory approaches to 
Arctic unconventional energy. It analyzes how the formal public law 
— such as treaties, statutes, and agency regulations — interacts with 
public-private arrangements to create a complex governance structure 
in this context. 
A. UNCLOS and Its Limits 
As noted in the Introduction, UNCLOS is the most significant of the 
treaties relevant to Arctic offshore energy development. UNCLOS 
guarantees coastal states’ sovereignty over their coastal zones; recognizes 
property rights — including resource rights such as those to offshore oil 
and gas — over their exclusive economic zones (“EEZs”) of 200 nautical 
miles and continental shelves; and protects the marine environment of 
the international high seas.62 This Section describes the importance and 
the limits of UNCLOS for oil and gas extraction in the Arctic. 
Following a decade of negotiations, the Law of the Sea Convention 
was adopted by the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of 
the Sea in 1982.63 As of April 2015, 167 states and the European 
 
 62 Id. at arts. 55–57, 192–237. 
 63 See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, 
Overview and Full Text, OCEANS & L. SEA, DIVISION FOR OCEAN AFF. & L. SEA, UNITED 
NATIONS (Aug. 22, 2013), http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/ 
convention_overview_convention.htm. 
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Commission were parties.64 This list includes all of the Arctic states, 
except the United States, which largely recognizes UNCLOS as 
customary international law.65 Over the past several years, UNCLOS 
has served as a key mechanism for resolving Arctic continental shelf 
and maritime boundary claims relevant to oil and gas development. 
Under UNCLOS Article 76 and Annex II, Article 4, a coastal state 
has 10 years from the time of ratification to submit scientific evidence 
regarding the limits of its extended outer continental shelf.66 
Historically, resolving the exact limits of the extended continental 
shelf was limited by the presence of year round ice. Further, the 
inaccessibility of resources expected to exist there meant that nations 
did not feel a sense of urgency about this issue.67 However, beginning 
with Russia in 2001, Arctic states began bringing claims to the United 
Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (“CLCS”) 
that would clarify natural resource rights under the Arctic Ocean.68 
 
 64 Chapter XXI Law of the Sea, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, https:// 
treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetailsIII.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXI-6&chapter=21& 
Temp=mtdsg3&lang=en (last visited Feb. 17, 2016).  
 65 Id.; see supra note 23. 
 66 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art.76, Annex II, art.4, Dec. 
10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 7, available at http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_ 
agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf. 
 67 See JESSICA SHADIAN, THE POLITICS OF ARCTIC SOVEREIGNTY: OIL, ICE, AND INUIT 
GOVERNANCE 178 (2014) [hereinafter ARCTIC SOVEREIGNTY]. 
 68 Russia, the first Arctic state to ratify UNCLOS, submitted a claim in 2001, 
providing research-based evidence that the Lomonosov Ridge was part of Russia’s 
coast. Norway, which ratified UNCLOS in 1996, submitted the last of its claims in 
2006 and 2009. Iceland and Denmark submitted their claims in April 2009. In June 
2010, Russia and Norway, of their own accord, resolved a 20-year dispute regarding 
the Barents Sea. The two countries have since begun to cooperate in developing the 
vast amounts of non-renewable resources said to exist in the Barents Sea. In December 
2013, Canada made a partial submission with the intention to submit information on 
the limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles in the Arctic Ocean at a 
later date. Submissions to the Commission: Partial Submission by Canada, OCEANS & L. 
SEA, DIVISION FOR OCEAN AFF. & L. SEA, UNITED NATIONS (Dec. 29, 2014), http:// 
www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/submission_can_70_2013.htm. The 
Canadian position is that the Northwest Passage is part of Canadian internal waters 
and is therefore an extension of the land boundary along the 141st Meridian to the 
North Pole. The United States argues that Canada’s land boundary ends at the shore. 
Much of the international community (Russia being an important exception) supports 
the U.S. claim. Other Arctic boundary disputes include (1) the border between Russia 
and the United States in the Beaufort Sea (the longest Arctic maritime boundary), (2) 
between Denmark/Greenland and Canada over Hans Island (a tentative deal on the 
Canadian-Danish boundary in the Lincoln Sea, north of Ellesmere Island between 
northeastern Canada and Greenland, was negotiated in November 2012), and (3) a 
disputed Norwegian claim to the Spitsbergen Shelf. The Spitsbergen Treaty of 1920 
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The United States is the only Arctic state that cannot bring such claims 
because it is not party to UNCLOS. The United States does recognize 
UNCLOS as customary international law, though, and some of the 
continental shelf disputes in the Arctic involve its continental shelf 
boundaries.69 
The Arctic states made the central role of UNCLOS in resolving 
Arctic boundary disputes more explicit in 2008, the same year in 
which the U.S. National Snow and Ice Data Center reported that the 
polar cap had shrunk to its second smallest size in recorded history 
and the Northwest Passage was ice-free for the second consecutive 
summer.70 Amid growing international attention to the Arctic and 
media reports stating that the Arctic states could be heading towards 
war,71 the five Arctic coastal states — Canada, Denmark, Norway, the 
Russian Federation and the United States — met in Ilulissat, 
Greenland in May 2008. The meeting concluded with the signing of 
the Ilulissat Declaration, which underscored the resolve of the Arctic 
 
does not make it clear whether Norway has rights over that island’s EEZ. Kim 
Mackrael, Canada, Denmark Closer to Settling Border Dispute, GLOBE & MAIL (Nov. 29, 
2012), www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/canada-denmark-closer-to-settling-
border-dispute/article5831571. For an in-depth discussion of the legal issues 
surrounding claims to Arctic outer continental shelves, see MICHAEL BYERS, 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ARCTIC 92-127 (2013); TIMO KOIVUROVA ET AL., 
CONTINENTAL SHELF CLAIMS IN THE ARCTIC: WILL LEGAL PROCEDURE SURVIVE THE 
GROWING UNCERTAINTY? 1-8 (FIIA Briefing Paper No. 178, Aug. 2015), available at 
http://www.fiia.fi/en/publication/516/ 
continental_shelf_claims_in_the_arctic. 
 69 This renewed focus on UNCLOS also reinvigorated ratification debates, which 
continue despite the last several Democratic and Republican presidential administrations 
supporting ratification. See Stewart M. Patrick, (Almost) Everyone Agrees: The U.S. Should 
Ratify the Law of the Sea Treaty, ATLANTIC (June 10, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/ 
international/archive/2012/06/-almost-everyone-agrees-the-us-should-ratify-the-law-of-the-
sea-treaty/258301. For a discussion of U.S. efforts at continental shelf delineation, see 
Defining the Limits of the U.S. Continental Shelf, U.S. DEP’T ST., http://www. 
state.gov/e/oes/continentalshelf (last visited Feb. 15, 2016). 
 70 Bob Tkacz, Arctic Conference Emphasizes Cooperation to Address New Issues, 
ALASKA J. COM. (June 4, 2009), http://www.alaskajournal.com/community/2009-06-
05/arctic-conference-emphasizes-cooperation-address-new-issues. 
 71 ANNETA LYTVYNENKO, ARCTIC SOVEREIGNTY POLICY REVIEW (Apr. 5, 2011), available at 
http://www4.carleton.ca/cifp/app/serve.php/1355.pdf; Jamie Doward, et al., Russia Leads 
Race for North Pole Oil, GUARDIAN (July 29, 2007), http://www.theguardian. 
com/world/2007/jul/29/russia.oil; Military Tensions Heating Up on Canada’s Coldest Frontier, 
LIVE LEAK (Mar. 1, 2009), www.liveleak.com/view?i=8c7_1235958275; Russian General 
Fires Arctic Warning, CANWEST NEWS SERV. (June 24, 2008), www.canada.com/ 
topics/news/story.html?id=ac0d24dfdc10-43da-89f3-b3c3c0928ae7; Paul Reynolds, The 
Arctic’s New Gold Rush, BBC NEWS (Oct. 25, 2005), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/ 
4354036.stm. 
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states to sustainably manage the Arctic Ocean, as well as their 
commitment to international peace through law.72 It also, most 
importantly for the energy extraction context, established UNCLOS as 
the primary mechanism through which they would resolve existing 
territorial disputes in the Arctic: 
By virtue of their sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction 
in large areas of the Arctic Ocean the five coastal states are in a 
unique position to address these possibilities and challenges. 
In this regard, we recall that an extensive international legal 
framework applies to the Arctic Ocean . . . . Notably, the law 
of the sea provides for important rights and obligations 
concerning the delineation of the outer limits of the 
continental shelf, the protection of the marine environment, 
including ice-covered areas, freedom of navigation, marine 
scientific research, and other uses of the sea. We remain 
committed to this legal framework and to the orderly 
settlement of any possible overlapping claims.73 
Although the meeting and resulting Ilulissat Declaration were 
helpful in providing clarity about how property rights would be 
resolved among Arctic states, they did not include key stakeholders 
beyond those five nation-states. The non-coastal Arctic Council states 
(as well as Iceland) were not invited to the meeting, and despite the 
meeting taking place in Greenland, the Inuit Circumpolar Council 
(“ICC”) and the other five Permanent Indigenous Participants of the 
Arctic Council — described in the next section — did not have a 
formal role to play. 
Aqqaluk Lynge, the only indigenous representative at the meeting, 
expressed his concerns with the meeting’s limited focus on nation-
state land claims and its implications for Inuit property rights: 
the Inuit Circumpolar Council has been invited here, I 
presume, to give you insight into how Inuit are exploring the 
new question that others seem to be posing with increasing 
intensity. The new question and the debate that it has 
generated is an old one for Inuit . . . While “ownership” is an 
uncomfortable concept for Inuit, it is a word we have to face 
today because others are asking it. . . . While Inuit were not 
formally asked about the borders that have been created 
 
 72 Ilulissat Declaration, supra note 23. 
 73 Id. 
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among us, we are nevertheless practical and believe in 
compromise. . . Yesterday’s debate does not only begin with 
the various land claims processes in each country. It goes back 
to the time when the first foreign whaling ship came in the 
1600s to hunt our big whales and decimate our stocks from 
which they have never recovered. . . . While we are 
uncomfortable with the word “own,” I say it is all Inuit who 
“own” much of the Arctic, if I must use a non-Inuit word. And 
through ICC, Inuit will continue to voice this message loudly, 
clearly, and collectively.74 
As Lynge’s remarks illustrate, UNCLOS can and is playing a helpful 
role in recommending how to divide the Arctic Ocean and delineate 
state claims. Its focus on these nation-state-based rights does not, 
however, specifically determine who within those countries have the 
rights and responsibilities to manage the Arctic’s resources and, as 
such, fails to address the rights and role of non-state actors such as 
Inuit in managing and controlling Arctic development. While 
UNCLOS is highly relevant in helping to create formal boundaries 
between sovereign states, it does not establish needed governance 
structures for offshore Arctic oil and gas development nor a legitimate 
role and authority for those non-state entities that are critical to its 
development. As discussed in the next section, the Arctic Council, 
with its more inclusive structure but less formal authority, is 
increasingly assuming that more nuanced role. 
B. Arctic Council 
The only fully circumpolar and comprehensive governance 
institution in the Arctic is the Arctic Council.75 Arctic regime building 
began in the late 1980s in Finland,76 was then superseded by Canadian 
 
 74 Aqqaluk Lynge, Address to the Ministerial Summit of Arctic Oceans: The New 
Debate of Who Owns the Arctic Is an Old One for Inuit (May 28, 2008), available at 
http://www.iccalaska.org/servlet/download?id=92. 
 75 The Arctic Council is both a transnational and intergovernmental institution. It 
is intergovernmental because it brings together the eight Arctic states to collaborate on 
Arctic issues, including formulating binding treaties. At the same time, there are six 
indigenous organizations (Permanent Participants) that sit at the negotiating table and 
fully participate and debate all matters alongside the eight Arctic states, as well as 
numerous official governmental and nongovernmental observers.  
 76 More generally, throughout the 1970s and 1980s, regional and global attention 
to the Arctic environment was minimal. At that time, the Cold War was the focus of 
all activities in the region. The only evidence of Arctic intergovernmental cooperation 
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efforts, and culminated with the ratification of the Arctic Council in 
1996. The initial Finnish Initiative was an ad hoc multilateral 
cooperation among Arctic nation-states aimed at moving them 
towards a collective environmental strategy77 and emerged from a 
Consultative Meeting on the Protection of the Arctic Environment in 
Rovaniemi, Finland in September of 1989. Two groups were created at 
that time — one focused on the state of the environment in the Arctic 
and the other examined the existing legal instruments for protecting 
the Arctic environment and the organization for future cooperation. 
The Finnish Initiative, according to Mary Simon, a Canadian (Inuk) 
involved in the process, “provide[d] a crucial opportunity for Arctic 
states and indigenous peoples to devise a sustainable and equitable 
development strategy for the circumpolar North . . . the direct 
involvement of indigenous peoples in the Finnish Initiative should 
serve to enrich this vital, new multilateral process.”78 
The inception of the Finnish Initiative began a process of building a 
fully circumpolar political collaboration led by Finland initially and 
then Canada. All eight Arctic states committed to the idea that the 
Arctic is a distinct political region and, together, set out to foster a 
new relationship with the larger international community. In 1991, 
the ministers of the environment of the eight Arctic states came 
together and signed the Rovaniemi Declaration, which created the 
Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (“AEPS”) to operationalize 
the Finnish Initiative. The Rovaniemi Declaration and the AEPS 
officially commenced an era of Arctic political institution building.79 
 
during this time was the Agreement on the Conservation of Polar Bears, which 
represented only five of the present-day Arctic states. Clive Archer & David Scrivener, 
International Co-operation in the Arctic Environment, in THE ARCTIC: ENVIRONMENT, 
PEOPLE, POLICY 601, 601-02 (Mark Nuttall & Terry V. Callaghan eds., 2000). By the 
late 1980s, global attention had turned towards the Arctic. The reasons for this 
included the rise of perestroika in Russia, growing interest in exploiting Arctic 
resources, and increasing awareness among scientists of the link between the Arctic’s 
physical condition and the state of the global environment. See SHADIAN, ARCTIC 
SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 67, at 105.  
 77 Mary Simon, Towards an Arctic Sustainable and Equitable Development Strategy; 
Some Preliminary Views, in PROTECTING THE ARCTIC ENVIRONMENT: REPORT ON THE 
YELLOWKNIFE PREPARATORY MEETING, APRIL 18–23, 1990, YELLOWKNIFE, NWT, CANADA 
(1990). 
 78 Id. 
 79 It should be noted that prior to the Rovaniemi Declaration, there was a formal 
multilateral treaty on the Conservation of Polar Bears, signed in Oslo, Nov. 15, 1973 
by the five nations with the largest polar bear populations: Canada, Denmark 
(Greenland), Norway (Svalbard), the United States, and the Soviet Union. Archer & 
Scrivener, supra note 76, at 602. 
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At the outset, the indigenous groups were not signatories to the 
AEPS, but instead the Arctic states merely committed themselves to 
“continue to promote cooperation with the arctic [sic] indigenous 
peoples and to invite their organizations to future meetings as 
observers.”80 Nevertheless, the Declaration recognized “the special 
relationship of the indigenous peoples and local populations to the 
Arctic and their unique contribution to the protection of the arctic 
environment.”81 
As discussions of an Arctic Council progressed, however, the Arctic 
states determined that the indigenous participants should be granted a 
special status, though its precise definition was still not resolved. 
There was no existing document or reference stating clearly how this 
status would differ from other existing observers such as various 
NGOs. Central to this ambiguity was whether or not special status 
inferred that the indigenous representatives were merely special 
participants or if this would give them equal standing as part of the 
managerial board.82 
This ambiguity was eventually resolved over the course of the 
biannual meetings of the executive level of the AEPS, the Senior Arctic 
Officials (“SAO”). These meetings gradually increased the scope of 
interest in the initiative to include coordination with NGOs, 
governmental scientists, indigenous peoples, and other actors with 
expertise in Arctic concerns. Yet the role and consistent contributions 
of three indigenous peoples organizations — the ICC, the Sámi 
Council and the Association of the Indigenous Minorities of the 
North, Siberia, and the Far East of the Russian Federation 
(“RAIPON”) — led to their transition from observers to Permanent 
Participants (“PPs”), with a mandate to help with “articulating the 
consensus” at the SAO and ministerial meetings.83 
By 1996, all eight Arctic countries had given their support to ratify 
the Declaration for the Arctic Council and at that time the three initial 
indigenous peoples organizations were formally designated PPs. In 
2000, the Aleut International Association (“AIA”) became a permanent 
participant in the first Iqaluit Declaration. The Arctic Athabaskan 
 
 80 Monica Tennberg, “Indigenous Peoples” Involvement in the Arctic Council, 4 
NORTHERN NOTES 21 (Dec. 1996), available at http://arcticcircle.uconn.edu/ 
NatResources/Policy/tennberg.html. 
 81 Id. 
 82 SHADIAN, ARCTIC SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 67, at 119. 
 83 Archer & Scrivener, supra note 76, at 608. 
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Council (“AAC”), and the Gwich’in Council International (“GCI”) 
were then established as PPs in the Barrow Declaration.84 
The structure that the Arctic Council created, which included a 
formal role for indigenous organizations, did not previously exist in 
the realm of traditional state-centered international relations. 
Specifically, the six indigenous organizations sit at the table as 
ministers, debate the issues with the other ministers, and receive 
recognition by the Chair in all matters. During the two-year period 
between meetings, PPs are full partners in all working groups 
including the ability to submit projects and activities.85 
The Arctic Council was established as a consensus-based body, 
constituted through political declaration rather than a legally binding 
charter. The central mandate of the Arctic Council is to help facilitate 
sustainable economic and social development in the Arctic, and it 
remains to date the most important fully circumpolar intergovernmental 
institution. With the creation of the Arctic Council, the AEPS became 
subsumed under the Arctic Council as an initiative. The overarching 
objective of the Arctic Council is to “provide a means for promoting 
cooperation, coordination and interaction among the Arctic States, with 
the involvement of Arctic indigenous communities and other Arctic 
inhabitants on common issue, in particular issues of sustainable 
development and environmental protection in the Arctic.”86 
Structurally, the Arctic Council is comprised of the eight Arctic 
countries and six permanent indigenous participants (all of which sit at 
the table). The Arctic Council also has a total of thirty-two observers. 
Observers can be non-Arctic states, inter-governmental and inter-
parliamentary organizations, global and regional, non-governmental 
organizations “that the Council determines can contribute to its 
work.”87 At the present time, twelve non-Arctic states, nine 
 
 84 Arctic Council, Barrow Declaration on the Occasion of the Second Ministerial 
Meeting of the Arctic Council 1, 6, 8 (Oct. 13, 2000), available at http:// 
oaarchive.arctic-council.org/bitstream/handle/11374/87/02_barrow_declaration_2000_ 
signed.pdf. 
 85 Because the Arctic Council is a consensus-based organization, PPs work 
together with the Arctic states to reach consensus on all matters. Id. at 2. 
 86 The Ottawa Declaration also explicitly states that the Arctic Council will not 
deal with matters related to military security. Arctic Council, Declaration on the 
Establishment of the Arctic Council (Sept. 19, 1996), available at 
https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/bitstream/handle/11374/85/00_ottawa_decl_1996_ 
signed%20%284%29.pdf. 
 87 Id. at art. 3. 
  
1454 University of California, Davis [Vol. 49:1431 
intergovernmental and inter-parliamentary organizations, and eleven 
nongovernmental organizations have been granted observer status.88 
The criteria for admitting observers includes among other factors 
“the extent to which observers”: (1) “[a]ccept and support the 
objectives of the Arctic Council,” (2) recognize Arctic States have 
“sovereignty, sovereign rights, and jurisdiction in the Arctic”; and (3) 
“[r]ecognize that an extensive legal framework applies to the Arctic 
Ocean including, notably, the Law of the Sea and that this framework 
provides a solid foundation for responsible management of this 
ocean.”89 Observers must also “[r]espect the values, interests, culture, 
and traditions of Arctic indigenous peoples and other Arctic 
inhabitants” and must demonstrate “a political willingness as well as 
financial ability to contribute to the work of the Permanent 
Participants and other Arctic indigenous peoples.”90 
Once admitted, observers are invited to Arctic Council meetings in a 
limited, non-voting capacity. For instance, they are not allowed to 
participate in the SAO meetings (these meetings are only open to the 
Arctic states and PPs). They can, however, participate more fully in 
the Council’s working groups. The last round of admitted countries 
took place in May 2013 when China, India, Italy, Japan, and South 
Korea were given observer status. In the lead up to their admission 
and partly due to the unprecedented number of applications, the 
Arctic Council updated its criteria for admission. Under this revised 
process, an application by the EU — among a number of other 
applications — was postponed.91 Despite this decision, the Arctic 
 
 88 Observers, ARCTIC COUNCIL (May 7, 2015), http://www.arctic-council.org/index. 
php/en/about-us/arctic-council/observers. 
 89 Id. 
 90 Id. 
 91 Reports have argued that the Arctic Council had concerns over the 2010 European 
Union (“EU”) ban on the import and sale of seal fur, meat and other products and 
subsequently a consensus was made by the Arctic Council that the EU did not sufficiently 
respect the values, interests, culture and traditions of Arctic indigenous peoples, which is 
one prerequisite for obtaining observer status. See Timo Koivurova et al., The Present and 
Future Competence of the European Union in the Arctic, 48 POLAR REC. 361, 366-69 (2012). 
In a Financial Times report regarding the application for permanent status, Lawrence 
Cannon, Canada’s Foreign Affairs Minister, stated: “Canada doesn’t feel that the European 
Union, at this stage, has the required sensitivity to be able to acknowledge the Arctic 
Council, as well as its membership, and so therefore I’m opposed to it.” Joshua Chaffin, 
Canada Slows EU Entry to Arctic Council, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 29, 2009), 
www.ft.com/cms/s/0/bacb51ee-34e8–11de-940a-00144feabdc0.html. The Arctic Council 
ultimately deferred the granting of observer status to the EU until after “the concerns of 
Council members” are resolved. Jim Bell, Canada Wants Permanent Fix for EU Seal Hunt 
Dispute: Aglukkaq, NUNATSIAQ NEWS (May 16, 2013), www.nunatsiaqonline.ca/ 
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Council generally takes the approach that it is better to work with 
interested observers than to exclude them. 
The Arctic Council has six working groups: Arctic Contaminants 
Action Program (“ACAP”); Arctic Monitoring and Assessment 
Programme (“AMAP”); Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna 
(“CAFF”); Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response 
(“EPPR”); PAME; and the Sustainable Development Working Group 
(“SDWG”).92 Most importantly for the unconventional energy context, 
as mentioned in the introduction, PAME, in collaboration with other 
working groups, has produced offshore oil and gas guidelines, with its 
most recent update report in 2014.93 The Council’s first set of 
guidelines, almost two decades ago, were an outcome of the Report of 
the Third Ministerial Conference on the Protection of the Arctic 
Environment in March 1996.94 
In 2002, the Guidelines were updated by the PAME working group 
with the help of EPPR, AMAP, and CAFF. The 2002 Guidelines 
included the involvement of representatives of Arctic, regional and 
other governments, non-governmental organizations, industry, 
indigenous people, and the scientific community. Since 2002, several 
new resources have been made available and in 2014 the guidelines 
were once again updated.95 Section III.B.1 discusses the 2014 
guidelines in more depth.96 
Growing interest in the Arctic has also prompted the Arctic Council 
to move away from being a consensus based, policy-shaping 
organization into being more of a policymaking regime in some 
instances. Most noteworthy in the context of oil and gas development 
are the 2011 Agreement on Cooperation in Aeronautical and Maritime 
Search and Rescue in the Arctic (“SAR”); 2013 Agreement on 
Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution, Preparedness and Response in 
the Arctic; and 2015 Framework Plan for Cooperation on Prevention 
of Oil Pollution from Petroleum and Maritime Activities in the Marine 
Areas of the Arctic.97 As discussed in more depth in Part III, the 2015 
 
stories/article/65674canada_wants_permanent_fix_for_eu_seal_hunt_dispute_aglukkaq. 
 92 Working Groups, ARCTIC COUNCIL (June 29, 2015), http://www.arctic-council. 
org/index.php/en/about-us/working-groups. 
 93 New Guidelines from PAME on Arctic Oil and Gas Safety Management, supra note 27. 
 94 Id. 
 95 New Guidelines from PAME on Arctic Oil and Gas Safety Management, PAME (May 
5, 2014), http://pame.is/index.php/shortcode/blog/item/30-aoogg-2014/30-aoogg-2014. 
 96 See infra Part III.B.1. 
 97 See Press Release, Arctic Council, Arctic Council Renews Commitment to Arctic 
Economic and Social Development and Environmental Protection (Apr. 24, 2015), 
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Framework Plan, approved by the Arctic state ministers on April 24, 
2015, supports cooperation among not only Arctic nations, but also 
with industry and indigenous peoples.98 
Aside from the formal working groups, in May 2013, as part of 
Canada’s chairmanship, the Arctic Council agreed to establish a 
circumpolar business forum. The mandate of this new Arctic 
Economic Council is to “foster business development in the Arctic, 
engage in deeper circumpolar cooperation, and provide a business 
perspective to the work of the Arctic Council.”99 The founding 
meeting took place in September 2014 in Iqaluit, Nunavut, Canada. 
Several oil and gas industry executives are part of this Council as 
nominated representatives of Arctic states in this process.100 
The transition of the Arctic Council Chairmanship in April 2015 
from Canada to the United States (2015–17) brought additional focus 
on unconventional energy development. This emphasis on 
unconventional energy began in the lead up to the Chairmanship. For 
example, Senator Murkowski of Alaska made the following comments 
on the Senate floor upon her return from the Arctic Council 
ministerial meeting in Kiruna, Sweden in May 2013: 
In 2015, the gavel of that chairmanship will pass from Canada 
to the United States, so we will be working to set the agenda, 
although it is a very consensus-driven process . . . . [T]hese 
consensus initiatives that help to advance the dynamic in an 
evolving part of the world. In Nuuk, the first-ever binding 
agreement of the parties was entered into, and this was a 
search-and-rescue agreement . . . . 
Yesterday, in Kiruna, it was the adoption of the Agreement on 
Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and 
Response in the Arctic. There is a recognition that in the 
 
available at http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/ministerial-meetings/27-iqaluit-
ministerial-2015/94-news-release-post-iqaluit; Agreements, ARCTIC COUNCIL, http://www. 
arctic-council.org/index.php/en/our-work/agreements (last updated Sept. 16, 2015). 
 98 See ARCTIC COUNCIL, FRAMEWORK PLAN FOR COOPERATION ON PREVENTION OF OIL 
POLLUTION FROM PETROLEUM AND MARITIME ACTIVITIES IN THE MARINE AREAS OF THE ARCTIC 
(Apr. 24, 2015), available at https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/bitstream/handle/ 
11374/609/ACMMCA09_Iqaluit_2015_SAO_Report_Annex_3_TFOPP_Framework_Plan.
pdf [hereinafter FRAMEWORK PLAN FOR COOPERATION]. 
 99 Arctic Economic Council, ARCTIC COUNCIL (Jan. 28, 2014), http://www.arctic-
council.org/index.php/en/our-work2/8-news-and-events/195-aec-2.  
 100 See Representatives, ARCTIC ECON. COUNCIL (2016), http://arcticeconomiccouncil. 
com/about-us/representatives.  
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Arctic, where some 15 percent of the world’s known oil and 
gas reserves are situated, there will be activity. We are seeing it 
in Russia to our left-hand side; we are seeing it in Canada to 
our right-hand side. In the United States, as we all know, Shell 
attempted to begin exploration this year. There have been 
previous exploration efforts up in the Beaufort and in the 
Chukchi. Whether you are for or against oil development here 
in this country, the recognition is that within the Arctic 
nations there is activity. There are ongoing efforts, whether it 
is through exploration or, hopefully, production that will 
move forward. 
. . . [W]e are putting forward collaboration and collective 
agreements so there is an understanding that in the event — 
hopefully, a very unlikely event — something would ever 
happen, there is an understanding as to how all the nations 
act, the level of preparation that moves forward.101 
In light of these interests, the United States established that its 
Chairmanship will include a focus on better preparation for a 
maritime disaster or oil spill, increasing resiliency in Arctic 
communities, and establishing new marine protected areas.102 This 
includes increased “sharing of oil spill preparedness and response 
capabilities” and the continued development of specialized pollution 
response resources and operational guidelines for responses in broken 
ice and ice-covered areas.103 The United States also seeks to improve 
SAR through the coordination of table-top exercises and possibly a 
“full scale live exercise.”104 In recognition of this role, a number of the 
key think tanks making recommendations in the lead up to the 
Chairmanship focused specifically on how the U.S. chairmanship 
could be used to address offshore oil and gas regulation.105 
The Arctic Council — despite its limited formal authority — is 
playing a key role in involving public and private stakeholders to 
 
 101 Congressional Record, Volume 159, Number 69 (Thursday, May 16, 2013), GOV’T 
PUBLISHING OFF., https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2013-05-16/html/CREC-2013-
05-16-pt1-PgS3538-2.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2016). 
 102 See One Arctic: Shared Opportunities, Challenges and Responsibilities, U.S. DEP’T 
ST. (2014), http://www.state.gov/e/oes/ocns/opa/arc/uschair. 
 103 Julie Gourley, One Arctic: Shared Opportunities, Challenges and Responsibilities, 
U.S. DEP’T ST. 1, 12 (2014), http://www.knom.org/wp-audio/2014/11/2014-11-03-US-
Chair-Arctic-Council.pdf. 
 104 Id. at 13.  
 105 See EBINGER ET AL., supra note 12, at 48-54. 
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establish a regional approach to addressing the risks of offshore oil 
and gas development. Yet how much the United States can accomplish 
during its chairmanship and whether or not the land locked country of 
Finland will place equal emphasis on this issue when it takes the 
Chairmanship in 2017 remains to be seen.106 
Moreover, additional Arctic Council governance issues likely will 
influence its role in the oil and gas context. First, a key issue facing 
the Arctic Council is whether or not the PPs will continue to maintain 
their authority in the face of its increasing efforts to make formally 
binding policies. The indigenous organizations that serve as PPs play a 
limited (and at times nonexistent) role in traditional treaty making. At 
the same time, their inclusion is critical because indigenous peoples in 
many cases have rights — which at times include ownership — to the 
lands, seas and resources where they live. Other commentators worry 
more generally about the diluting effect of new powerful nation-state 
observers, as well as the increasing number of observers in other 
categories despite recent efforts to limit that growth.107 
Second, the U.S. domestic interface with the Arctic Council remains 
highly fragmented with different agencies serving as leads for each of 
the six working groups. Although the State Department officially 
serves in a coordinating role, the United States will need to make sure 
that its approach is more coherent and coordinated in order to 
maximize its effectiveness during its term as chair. In one step in this 
direction, on January 21, 2015, President Obama signed an Executive 
Order 13689 on Enhancing Coordination of National Efforts in the 
Arctic.108 The executive order “established an Arctic Executive 
Steering Committee (“Steering Committee”), which shall provide 
guidance to executive departments and agencies (“agencies”) and 
enhance coordination of Federal Arctic policies across agencies and 
offices, and, where applicable, with State, local, and Alaska Native 
tribal governments and similar Alaska Native organizations, academic 
and research institutions, and the private and nonprofit sectors.”109 
 
 106 For a discussion of the current U.S. work under its Chairmanship, see U.S. 
Chairmanship 2015–2017, ARCTIC COUNCIL (2015), http://www.arctic-council.org/ 
index.php/en/about-us/arctic-council/u-s-chairmanship. 
 107 See Andrea Charron, Has the Arctic Council Become Too Big?, INT’L REL. & 
SECURITY NETWORK (Aug. 15, 2014), http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/ 
Detail/?id=182827 (exploring the complexities of this expansion). 
 108 See generally Exec. Order No. 13,689, 80 Fed. Reg. 4191 (Jan. 26, 2015), available at 
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/DCPD-201500039/pdf/DCPD-201500039.pdf. 
 109 Id. In particular, its charge has been described as follows: 
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The Steering Committee includes representatives from the key 
agencies involved in Arctic-relevant issues, and may help address some 
of the fragmentation concerns with the U.S. interface with the Arctic 
Council over time.110 
 
The Steering Committee, in coordination with the heads of relevant agencies 
and under the direction of the Chair, shall: 
(a) provide guidance and coordinate efforts to implement the priorities, 
objectives, activities, and responsibilities identified in National Security 
Presidential Directive 66/Homeland Security Presidential Directive 25, Arctic 
Region Policy, the National Strategy for the Arctic Region and its 
Implementation Plan, and related agency plans; 
(b) provide guidance on prioritizing Federal activities, consistent with 
agency authorities, while the United States is Chair of the Arctic Council, 
including, where appropriate, recommendations for resources to use in 
carrying out those activities; and 
(c) establish a working group to provide a report to the Steering Committee 
by May 1, 2015, that: 
(i) identifies potential areas of overlap between and within agencies with 
respect to implementation of Arctic policy and strategic priorities and 
provides recommendations to increase coordination and reduce any 
duplication of effort, which may include ways to increase the effectiveness of 
existing groups; and 
(ii) provides recommendations to address any potential gaps in 
implementation. 
. . . .  
[D]evelop a process to improve coordination and the sharing of information 
and knowledge among Federal, State, local, and Alaska Native tribal 
governments and similar Alaska Native organizations, and private-sector and 
nonprofit-sector groups on Arctic issues; . . . [In order to do this the steering 
committee will] establish a process to ensure tribal consultation and 
collaboration, consistent with my memorandum of November 5, 2009 
(Tribal Consultation). 
 110 See id. Specifically, it includes: 
(i) the heads, or their designees, of the Office of Science and Technology 
Policy, the Council on Environmental Quality, the Domestic Policy Council, 
and the National Security Council; 
(ii) the Executive Officer of the Steering Committee, who shall be designated 
by the Chair of the Steering Committee (Chair); and 
(iii) the Deputy Secretary or equivalent officer from the Departments of 
State, Defense, Justice, the Interior, Agriculture, Commerce, Labor, Health 
and Human Services, Transportation, Energy, and Homeland Security; the 
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Finally, beyond any direct questions of the Arctic Council’s 
governance role and effectiveness, several other entities are also 
addressing standards and resource management issues regarding 
offshore drilling and oil spills. The following sections detail those 
additional roles and the complexity that they add. 
C. Trade Associations and Standard Setting Organizations 
Parallel to the supranational agreements reached through UNCLOS 
and the latest agreements concerning offshore activities by the Arctic 
Council, several trade associations and standard-setting organizations 
— most notably the American Petroleum Institute; International Oil 
and Gas Producers Association; IPIECA, the global oil and gas 
industry association for environmental and social issues; and 
International Organization for Standardization — have all taken recent 
steps to try to support safer and more effective industry practices.111 
This Section describes the efforts of those four entities, as well as some 
of the other oil and gas industry activities. 
The American Petroleum Institute (“API”) is a U.S. national trade 
association that focuses on all aspects of the oil and natural gas industry. 
It originated during World War I, when the oil and gas industry worked 
together with Congress to support the war effort. Its members “are 
dedicated to continuous efforts to improve the compatibility of their 
operations with the environment while economically developing energy 
resources and supplying high quality products and services to 
consumers.”112 API has helped to develop oil and gas industry 
equipment and operating standards since 1924. It works with industry 
experts to maintain over 600 standards and recommended practices, 
and distributes over 300,000 documents annually.113 
API has issued several standards regarding offshore drilling, including 
ones on pipelines, platforms, and safety management in offshore 
 
Office of the Director of National Intelligence; the Environmental Protection 
Agency; the National Aeronautics and Space Administration; the National 
Science Foundation; the Arctic Research Commission; and the Office of 
Management and Budget; the Assistant to the President for Public 
Engagement and Intergovernmental Affairs, or his or her designee; and other 
agencies or offices as determined appropriate by the Chair. 
 111 See EBINGER ET AL., supra note 12, at 21-33. 
 112 About API, AM. PETROLEUM INST., http://www.api.org/globalitems/globalheaderpages/ 
about-api (last visited Mar. 28, 2016).  
 113 Publications, Standards, and Statistics Overview, AM. PETROLEUM INST., 
http://www.api.org/publications-standards-and-statistics (last visited Mar. 28, 2016).  
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operations.114 Its RP 2N standard focuses on “Planning, Designing, and 
Constructing Structures and Pipelines for Arctic Conditions” in 
particular, indicating that it should be used together with other offshore 
drilling-related standards. It provides recommended practice for the 
Arctic environment for several systems, including: 
• offshore concrete, steel, and hybrid structures, sand islands, 
and gravel islands used as platforms for exploration, drilling or 
production; 
• offshore ice islands used as platforms for exploration 
drilling; 
• near shore causeways; 
• offshore pipelines; and 
• shore crossings for pipelines115 
The International Association of Oil and Gas Producers (“IOGP”) 
provides a forum for leading publicly-traded, private and state-owned 
oil and gas companies, industry associations, and major upstream 
service companies to identify and share best practices. IOGP was 
formed in 1974 to foster effective communications between the ever-
more complex network of international regulators and upstream 
industry. Its members produce over half of the world’s oil and roughly 
a third of its gas, making it a particularly significant association.116 
In 2014, IOGP formed an Arctic Committee out of a recognition of 
the region’s important role in meeting the world’s energy demand in 
coming decades. That committee will: 
• Act as the technical and advocacy focal point for the E&P 
industry on issues related to upstream activities in the Arctic 
and cold region environments more generally, consistent with 
the principles of sustainability. 
• Develop a long-term strategy to address the key Arctic 
issues for the upstream industry. 
 
 114 See EBINGER ET AL., supra note 12, at 30. 
 115 See AM. PETROLEUM INST., PUBLICATIONS, PROGRAMS AND SERVICES 1-42 (2014), 
available at http://www.api.org/~/media/Files/Publications/Catalog/Final-catalog.pdf 
(listing the recommended practices and requirements for these systems). 
 116 See About IOGP, INT’L ASS’N OIL & GAS PRODUCERS, http://www.iogp.org/About-
IOGP (last visited Mar. 28, 2016).  
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• Review and shape work of global importance being carried 
out within IOGP standing committees and in other entities 
regarding the development of good practices and guidelines 
associated with working in Arctic conditions. 
• Monitor, review and contribute to international and 
regional regulatory and policy developments in relation to the 
Arctic. 
• Establish and support industry positions with respect to 
regulatory developments and, through the IOGP secretariat, 
advocate and communicate those positions in close liaison 
with national/regional associations.117 
IOGP also established the Arctic Coordination Task Force to serve 
as the “technical and advocacy focal point for the E&P industry on 
issues related to upstream activities in the Arctic.” The task force has 
the following objectives: 
• Develop a long-term strategy to address the key arctic issues 
for upstream industry 
• Review and shape projects of pan-arctic importance being 
carried out within OGP and other entities 
• Monitor, review and contribute to and provide advocacy on 
policy and regulatory developments affecting the Arctic 
• Advise IOGP of issues impacting industry’s ability to gain 
access and operate in arctic regions.118 
The task force is currently focusing on issues of Arctic science, Arctic 
spill response, climate change mitigation, the effect of sounds on marine 
life, the development of technology and operating standards, natural 
resources development and management, and indigenous peoples.119 
In addition, IOGP has developed and published guidelines and a 
good practice guide for Arctic environmental protection. It produced 
recommendations for preventing, intervening and responding to well 
incidents in the aftermath of the BP Deepwater Horizon disaster. It also 
helped to form the Arctic Oil Spill Response Technology Joint 
 
 117 See INT’L ASS’N OF OIL & GAS PRODUCERS, OGP HIGHLIGHTS 1 (Feb.–Mar. 2014), 
available at http://www.iogp.org/PapersPDF/1403.pdf.  
 118 See Arctic Committee, INT’L ASS’N OIL & GAS PRODUCERS, http://www.iogp.org/ 
arctic-committee (last visited Mar. 28, 2016). 
 119 See id. 
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Industry Programme (“JIP”), which brings together companies to 
research and develop technologies and approaches for responding to 
Arctic marine oil spills. IOGP advocated for the formation of the 
Subsea Well Response Project (“SWRP”), serves as a non-
governmental observer to the Convention for the Protection of the 
Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic (“OSPAR”), and 
applied for — but was denied — Arctic Council observer status.120 
Like IOGP, IPIECA is a “global oil and gas industry association for 
environmental and social issues” formed in 1974. Its members also 
produce over half the world’s oil, but, unlike IOGP, they include both 
upstream and downstream oil and gas industry participants. Its 
formation was tied to the launch of the United Nations Environment 
Programme (“UNEP”), and IPIECA serves as the primary mechanism 
through which the industry communicates with the United Nations.121 
IPIECA has oil spill preparedness as one of its focus areas,122 and 
has been very active on Arctic issues. In 2009, IPIECA created an Oil 
Spill Response in the Arctic Task Force focused on improving 
“coordination of industry efforts in identifying research needs for 
spills in cold environments.” Its initial meeting in 2009 aimed to 
advance work on an IPIECA/API publication on Oil Spill Response in 
Arctic and Cold Climate Conditions, and to analyze technology and 
research needs regarding spills in cold environments.123 IPIECA also 
co-authored a report with IOGP on Spill Response in the Arctic Offshore 
that the JIP used as the basis for a white paper.124 
The International Organization for Standardization (“ISO”) is an 
independent, non-governmental membership organization that 
develops voluntary international standards. It has sixty-three member 
countries and is the largest organization of its kind in the world. ISO’s 
Technical Committee 67 focuses on structures used in offshore oil and 
gas exploration. The Committee’s scope includes “[s]tandardization of 
the materials, equipment and offshore structures used in the drilling, 
production, transport by pipelines and processing of liquid and 
 
 120 See EBINGER ET AL., supra note 12, at 31. 
 121 See About Us, IPIECA, http://www.ipieca.org/about-us (last visited Mar. 28, 
2016). 
 122 See Oil Spill Preparedness, IPIECA, http://www.ipieca.org/focus-area/oil-spill-
preparedness (last visited Mar. 28, 2016). 
 123 See Oil Spill Response in the Arctic Task Force Formed, IPIECA (Oct. 14, 2009), 
http://www.ipieca.org/?q=news/20091015/oil-spill-response-arctic-task-force-formed.  
 124 See ARCTIC RESPONSE TECH. OIL SPILL PREPAREDNESS, SPILL RESPONSE IN THE 
ARCTIC OFFSHORE 1 (2012), available at http://www.arcticresponsetechnology.org/ 
wpcontent/uploads/2012/11/FINAL-printed-brochure-for-ATC.pdf.  
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gaseous hydrocarbons within the petroleum, petrochemical and 
natural gas industries.”125 The ISO has published 198 standards related 
to this Committee, with twenty-three under its direct responsibility. 
Thirty-two countries are participating in this Committee and thirty-
four more are observing.126 
Through its committee working on offshore drilling, the ISO has 
done significant standards development focused on the Arctic. Its ISO-
19906 standard addresses Arctic offshore structures, and several Arctic 
nations are adopting it.127 The ISO also created Subcommittee 8 on 
Arctic operations within Technical Committee 67.128 The 
Subcommittee has established working groups on the working 
environment; escape, evacuation, and rescue; environmental 
monitoring; ice management; Arctic materials; physical environment 
for Arctic operations; and man-made islands and land extension. This 
subcommittee will also be responsible for developing standards for oil 
and gas operations in cold climate regions that aim to ensure safe and 
effective Arctic oil and gas operations and protection of the 
environment and the people working and living in these regions.129 
Other entities discussed in this Section are working to collaborate 
with the ISO. For example, the IOGP’s Arctic Coordination Task Force 
is seeking to be a formal liaison to Subcommittee 8. In addition, the 
Barents 2020 project, which focuses on developing safety standards for 
the Barents Sea between Russia and Norway, has submitted 
recommendations to the ISO.130 
These various interrelated efforts by leading industry and standard 
setting organizations are only some of the most Arctic specific and 
well developed. Numerous other private and public-private entities are 
 
 125 ISO/TC 67 Materials, Equipment and Offshore Structures for Petroleum, 
Petrochemical and Natural Gas Industries, ISO, http://www.iso.org/iso/iso_technical_ 
committee?commid=49506 (last visited Mar. 28, 2016).  
 126 See id. 
 127 See ISO 19906:2010, ISO (Dec. 15, 2010), http://www.iso.org/iso/catalogue_ 
detail.htm?csnumber=33690; EBINGER ET AL., supra note 12, at 33 (stating that the 
European Union has adopted it, while Russia and Canada are in the process of 
adopting it).  
 128 See ISO/TC 67/SC 8 Arctic Operations, ISO (2011), http://www.iso.org/iso/ 
standards_development/technical_committees/other_bodies/iso_technical_committee.htm?
commid=652790.  
 129 See id.; ISO/TC 67/SC 8 — Arctic Operations, Standards Catalogue, ISO (2016), 
http://www.iso.org/iso/home/store/catalogue_tc/catalogue_tc_browse.htm?commid=65279
0&development=on. 
 130 See EBINGER ET AL., supra note 12, at 28-30; Barents 2020 Reports, DNVGL 
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doing work on relevant standards and safety in the Arctic offshore 
environment. The Brookings Energy Security Initiative Report 
highlights several additional initiatives and organizations beyond these 
examples.131 This quasi-regulatory behavior — these standards are 
generally voluntary — form an important part of how corporate efforts 
to develop Arctic offshore resources are governed. Because these 
organizations have such a broad membership in the oil and gas 
industry and collaborate with national governments, their standards 
end up influencing transnational behavior of companies with Arctic 
operations. Moreover, as discussed in Part III, these standards are 
becoming part of governmental regulation through incorporation, 
such as in emerging U.S. standards for offshore oil and gas exploration 
in the Arctic. 
D. Public-Private Co-Management Arrangements 
Industry-based entities are not the only private actors with significant 
governance responsibilities in the Arctic. The indigenous peoples of the 
Arctic are not simply affected by climate change and offshore drilling. 
They also have long-standing co-management arrangements with 
national governments and have developed their own corporate entities 
involved in aspects of oil and gas development. While it varies among 
Arctic states the extent to which indigenous peoples have shared 
authority over land and offshore resources, they have in certain places 
attained resource, land, and property rights in the Arctic and have 
organized to serve as an important voice in decision-making in 
international, regional, and national governmental processes. 
Land claim processes in both the United States and Canada over the 
past four decades have resulted in arrangements that provide 
indigenous communities with some formal control. The historic 
Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (“ANCSA”) in 1971 led to a 
number of native controlled governments including the North Slope 
Borough in 1972, a public government with an Inupiat majority. 
ANCSA also helped establish thirteen regional for profit corporations 
to facilitate the transfer of property and monetary compensation. Such 
corporations include the Arctic Slope Regional Corporation and 
NANA (Inupiat are the shareholders for both of them). In Canada, the 
federal government has settled a number of Northern land claims. For 
instance, in the specific context of Inuit land claims, the James Bay 
and Northern Quebec Agreement (“JBNQA”) of 1975 became the first 
 
 131 See also EBINGER ET AL., supra note 12, at 31-32. 
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Inuit land claims agreement. This was followed by the Inuvialuit Final 
Agreement, Northwest Territories in 1984; the Nunavut Agreement in 
1993 (which came into effect in 1999); and the Inuit agreement in 
Labrador in 2005. Finally, in Nunavik, a series of agreements were 
reached with the federal government in 2007.132 Canadian Inuit have 
also developed major corporations with substantial revenues over this 
same time period — such as Makivik Corporation in Northern Quebec 
and Nunavut Tunngavik Inc. (“NTI”) in Nunavut, both of which 
closely interact with the governmentally-constituted arrangements. 
These North American grants of power to indigenous communities 
vary in the form of governance they create. The Arctic Human 
Development Report (“AHDR”), for instance, distinguishes between 
devolution and co-management arrangements: “Devolution refers to the 
transfer of power to more local and regional jurisdictions and 
governments” whereas co-management “typically involves a sharing of 
power between the state and resource-user communities.”133 Examples 
of devolution include the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act 
(“ANCSA”) and the Nunavut Land Claims Agreement. Co-management 
pertains specifically to resource use and is a regime in which 
stakeholders share power in managing specific resources. In the North 
American context, co-management commonly refers to a “shared 
decision-making process, formal or informal, between a government 
authority and a user group for managing a species of fish and wildlife, 
or other resource[s].”134 Co-management, as such, is not merely about 
consultation with indigenous communities after a project has been 
determined, but includes local community involvement from a project’s 
 
 132 ANCSA was the first Inuit land claim agreement which was signed in 1971. This 
was followed by the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement (“JBNQA”) passed in 
1975; the Inuvialuit Final Agreement, Northwest Territories in 1984; the Nunavut 
Agreement in 1993 (put into effect in 1999); the Inuit agreement in Labrador in 2005 
and finally, in Nunavik, a series of agreements were reached with the federal 
government in 2007.  
 133 RICHARD A. CAULFIELD ET AL., ARCTIC HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 121, 129 (2004), 
available at http://svs.is/images/pdf_files/ahdr/English_version/AHDR_chp_7.pdf.  
 134 Id. at 131. Co-management systems include a system of rights and obligations, 
rules that outline all shareholders responsibilities, and collective decision-making. See 
id. Co-management, as practiced in the Arctic, offers a space for knowledge sharing 
between users and scientists; acts as a balancing of power between users and 
government officials; provides a means for continual cooperation in research, 
education, and management; and recognizes cultural and linguistic differences as they 
impact effective understanding. See also id. at 129-31; F. Berkes et al., Co-Management: 
The Evolution in Theory and Practice of the Joint Administration of Living Resources, 
18 ALTERNATIVES 1, 11-18 (1991). 
  
2016] Arctic Energy Cooperation 1467 
inception. It thus serves as an important force shaping oil and gas 
development in communities whose rights extend to those resources. 
The governance role of indigenous communities and Inuit 
communities in particular has translated into a number of specific 
initiatives with relevance for Arctic unconventional energy 
development. For instance, the Nunavut Community-Based Wildlife 
Monitoring Network, among other tasks, acquires data and Inuit and 
local ecological knowledge relating to management zones, critical 
harvesting and other areas. It also documents species abundance and 
movement patterns, for setting wildlife research and management 
priorities.135 These efforts are critical pieces of the larger scientific 
research that encompasses any type of resource extraction including 
Arctic offshore oil and gas development. 
Another example, which will be explored in more depth in Part III, 
is the Prince William Sound Regional Citizens’ Advisory Council. This 
council was set up in the wake of the Exxon Valdez oil spill. Its mission 
is to promote environmentally safe operation of the Alyeska Pipeline 
marine terminal in Valdez and the oil tankers that use it. The council 
explains that it “regularly retains experts in various fields to conduct 
independent research on issues related to oil transportation safety.”136 
These initiatives often complement and reflect the particularities of 
the governance and property rights that indigenous communities have 
obtained. For example, in most parts of the Canadian Arctic where 
there are land claims settlements, aboriginal environmental 
governance is a process of joint jurisdiction that legally specifies both 
aboriginal and government rights and responsibilities. The established 
comprehensive claims agreements have one or more sections 
specifying how the jurisdiction for fisheries and wildlife management 
are shared; these co-management boards are the main instruments of 
resource management.137 For instance, the Beaufort Sea Integrated 
Management Planning Initiative (“BSIMPI”) started in 1999 with the 
collaboration of Inuvialuit management and co-management bodies, 
Department of Fisheries and Oceans (“DFO”), Department of Indian 
and Northern Affairs (“INAC”), and the oil and gas industry. The 
 
 135 See Community-Based Wildlife Monitoring Network, NUNAVUT WILDLIFE MGMT. BOARD 
(2016), http://www.nwmb.com/en/component/content/article/97-english/sidebars/current-
initiatives/107-community-based-wildlife-monitoring-network.  
 136 About Us, PRINCE WILLIAM SOUND REGIONAL CITIZENS’ ADVISORY COUNCIL, 
http://www.pwsrcac.org/about (last visited Apr. 22, 2012).  
 137 See Fikret Berkes et al., Collaborative Integrated Management in Canada’s North: 
The Role of Local and Traditional Knowledge and Community-Based Monitoring, 35 
COASTAL MGMT. 143, 147 (2007).  
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BSIMPI is comprised of two bodies: the Senior Management 
Committee and the Working Group. The BSIMPI Working Group is 
mandated to plan and deliver integrated ocean management activities, 
and link this work back to the communities. It is responsible for 
holding public meetings and for ensuring that the local Hunters and 
Trappers Committees, the Community Corporations which focus on 
economic development, and Elders’ Committees are consulted and 
given the opportunity to comment on BSIMPI activities at regular 
intervals.138 
Moreover, the North-American arrangements that this Section has 
focused on thus far represent only one variation in how indigenous 
communities are participating in land management in the Arctic. 
Greenland Self-Rule, contrary to the devolution processes in Alaska 
and Canada which either directly or indirectly led to the creation of 
Inuit co-management regimes, has been a process, according to Frank 
Sejersen, of state building rather than devolution. Within the political 
capital of Nuuk, there is little discussion about co-management.139 
Instead citizens participate in resource management though citizen 
groups such as the Association of Fishermen and Hunters in 
Greenland (“KNAPK”) or the Greenland Employers’ Association 
(“GA”), (not totally unlike interest groups in the United States) which 
represent their constituents and lobby the Greenlandic government to 
enact policies in their favor. 
When it comes to discussions around offshore oil and gas 
specifically, local communities are involved through processes of 
stakeholder dialogues (often taking place in Nuuk, where citizen 
groups speak on behalf of community members) or consultation 
processes where the companies involved in a project visit the 
communities that will be affected. These visits are often viewed as 
“explanations” to rather than consultations with local community 
members. In the case of Greenland, community frustrations with 
consultation processes includes feelings that the information provided 
 
 138 See id. at 149. 
 139 Frank Sejersen, Local Knowledge in Greenland: Arctic Perspectives and Contextual 
Differences, in CULTIVATING ARCTIC LANDSCAPES: KNOWING AND MANAGING ANIMALS IN 
THE CIRCUMPOLAR NORTH 33, 33-54 (D. Anderson & M. Nuttall eds., 2004). Greenland 
attained Home Rule in 1979. In 2009, Greenland Home Rule was replaced by 
Greenland Self Rule. A key component of the Self Rule legislation concerns 
Greenland’s resources. While sovereign statehood was not sought, the new Self Rule 
Government acquired the right to develop its subsurface minerals, which were 
deemed to belong to Greenland. Thus, Greenland achieved total control over its 
renewable and non-renewable resources. Id. 
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is too technical, it fails to address the questions that are of importance 
to the community members, there is not enough time to learn about 
the project before the consultation, and community members are not 
well enough informed beforehand for the meeting.140 
Overall, the relationship between Arctic indigenous communities 
and unconventional energy development is nuanced, which plays out 
in these shared governance arrangements. For example, despite the 
media focus on and litigation over the ways in which climate change is 
disrupting traditional indigenous ways of life, a number of Inuit 
communities also treat the greater accessibility to natural resources, 
including offshore oil and gas, due to Arctic melting as a potential 
opportunity. For those communities, resource development is viewed 
as a means to improve standards of living and gain further economic 
autonomy, which was reflected in the mixed reactions to the Shell Oil 
pull out described in the Introduction.141 The May 2011 ICC 
Circumpolar Inuit Declaration on Resource Development Principles in 
Inuit Nunaat, for instance, states that: 
[r]esponsible non-renewable resource development can also 
make an important and durable contribution to the well-being 
of current and future generations of Inuit. Managed under 
Inuit Nunaat governance structures, non-renewable resource 
development can contribute to Inuit economic and social 
development through both private sector channels 
(employment, incomes, businesses) and public sector channels 
(revenues from publicly owned lands, tax revenues, 
infrastructure). . . . Inuit welcome the opportunity to work in 
full partnership with resource developers, governments and 
local communities in the sustainable development of resources 
of Inuit Nunaat, including related policy-making, to the long-
lasting benefit of Inuit and with respect for baseline 
environmental and social responsibilities.142 
 
 140 See Ilisimatusarfik University of Greenland Successfully Hosts Nation’s First Ever Oil 
and Gas Key Stakeholder Dialogue, UARCTIC (Oct. 20, 2011), http://www.uarctic. 
org/news/2011/10/ilisimatusarfikuniversity-of-greenland-successfully-hosts-nations-first-
ever-oil-and-gas-key-stakeholder-dialogue. 
 141 See supra INTRODUCTION. 
 142 ICC (INUIT CIRCUMPOLAR COUNCIL), A CIRCUMPOLAR INUIT DECLARATION ON 
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At the same time, coastal Arctic indigenous communities such as 
Inuit in Alaska, Canada, and Greenland, as well as Aleut (in Alaska 
and Russia), often possess local/traditional knowledge needed to 
establish where and when offshore development comes into contact 
with Arctic mammal migration, fisheries, wildlife, and environmental 
changes more generally. Their local knowledge and proximity 
positions them to spot and participate in a response to an oil spill or 
other incident (indigenous coastal communities also, by proximity, 
could very well become first responders or the first contact on land as 
the Coast Guard and other entities can be hours or days if not weeks 
away, depending on weather conditions). Arctic indigenous coastal 
communities are, in effect, the “boots on the ground” and, as such, are 
already taking an active role in developing and participating in 
emergency response (from being first responders to monitoring 
problems or changes on and off shore in the Arctic to providing 
shelter for stranded people).143 
E. U.S. Regulation of Offshore Oil and Gas 
For each of the Arctic states, a mix of public and private 
transnational entities interacts with a domestic law system regulating 
offshore drilling and oil spill responses. The U.S. approach, which is 
evolving in response to the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill and growing 
interest in the Arctic, exemplifies the complexities of domestic 
regulation in this context. Moreover, as explored in Part III, federal 
regulatory efforts, despite their apparently clear role as a site for 
domestic national regulation, incorporate transnational governmental 
and nongovernmental efforts at standard setting. 
With respect to the regulation of the offshore drilling generally, U.S. 
law provides a mix of federal and state authority.144 Depending on 
how far from the coast drilling takes place, the federal and state 
governments (in the case, Alaska) have regulatory roles based on the 
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (“OCSLA”) and Coastal Zone 
Management Act (“CZMA”).145 In addition, Alaska state contract law 
 
 143 See Jane George, Stranded Passengers Find Warmth in Kugluktuk, NUNATSIAQ 
ONLINE (Aug. 30, 2010, 2:19 PM), http://www.nunatsiaqonline.ca/stories/article/ 
3008109_Stranded-passengers_crew_find_warm_welcome_in_Kugluktuk.  
 144 For Hari Osofsky’s in depth discussion of these governance structures and their 
complex dynamics, see Osofsky, Multidimensional Governance, supra note 32, at 1084, 
1086-87. 
 145 See Coastal Zone Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451–1466 (2012); Outer 
Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331–1356b (2012). Coastal states, with 
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applies as federal law to the various subcontracting relationships 
involved in the offshore drilling operations.146 
Federal regulation of offshore drilling is largely promulgated and 
enforced by the Department of the Interior (“DOI”) and the Coast 
Guard.147 The Coast Guard oversees the platform level and DOI 
regulates sub-platform drilling systems.148 The regulatory structure 
within DOI has changed in response to the BP Deepwater Horizon spill; 
Order 3299 separated leasing, environmental oversight, and money 
collection through establishing Bureau of Ocean Energy Management 
(“BOEM”); the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement 
(“BSEE”); and the Office of Natural Resource Revenue.149 DOI 
Secretary Salazar also established an Ocean Energy Safety Advisory 
Committee, “a permanent advisory body of the nation’s leading 
scientific, engineering, and technical experts who will provide critical 
 
some exceptions not relevant to the Arctic context, have jurisdiction that extends to 
three nautical miles from the shore at mean low tide. See 43 U.S.C. § 1337 (2012). 
The dividing of state and federal authority over the submerged land offshore 
contained in these statutes was first established under the Submerged Lands Act, ch. 
65, 67 Stat. 29 (1953) (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301–1315 (2012)). For 
an analysis of how this regime evolved, see Rachael E. Salcido, Offshore Federalism and 
Ocean Industrialization, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1355, 1375-96 (2008). 
 146 See 43 U.S.C. § 1333 (2012); Fruge ex rel. Fruge v. Parker Drilling Co., 337 
F.3d 558, 560 (5th Cir. 2003) (“Federal jurisdiction is predicated on the Outer 
Continental Shelf Lands Act (OSCLA) . . . [and] OCSLA adopts the law of the adjacent 
state (Louisiana) as surrogate federal law, to the extent that it is not inconsistent with 
other federal laws and regulations.” (citations omitted)). For an example of the 
relevant Louisiana law, see LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4807(C) (2015) (“A subcontractor 
is one who, by contract made directly with a contractor, or by a contract that is one of 
a series of contracts emanating from a contractor, is bound to perform all or a part of a 
work contracted for by the contractor.”). 
 147 See CURRY L. HAGERTY & JONATHAN L. RAMSEUR, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41262, 
DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL 13-17 (2010). For a discussion of the oil-spill response 
command structure, see Nat’l Comm’n on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill & 
Offshore Drilling, Decision-Making Within the Unified Command 2 (Staff Working 
Paper No. 2, 2011), available at http://cybercemetery.unt.edu/archive/oilspill/ 
20121211010432/http://www.oilspillcommission.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Updated
%20Unified%20Command%20Working%20Paper.pdf. 
 148 HAGERTY & RAMSEUR, supra note 147, at 16. 
 149 See U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, SECRETARIAL ORDER NO. 3299, ESTABLISHMENT OF 
THE BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MANAGEMENT, THE BUREAU OF SAFETY AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT, AND THE OFFICE OF NATURAL RESOURCES REVENUE (May 
19, 2010), available at http://elips.doi.gov/ELIPS/0/doc/444/Page1.aspx. For a 
discussion of the ways in which outside review failed to catch problems with MMS 
analysis and of how outside review could be more effective, see Holly Doremus, 
Through Another’s Eyes: Getting the Benefit of Outside Perspectives in Environmental 
Review, 38 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 247, 262-71, 272-79 (2011). 
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guidance on improving offshore drilling safety, well containment, and 
spill response.”150 
In addition to this reorganization and institutional development, the 
Obama Administration’s response to the Deepwater Horizon disaster 
included rule revisions and development with respect to drilling and 
worker safety. According to the BSEE, these include: 
Enhanced Drilling Safety 
• Operators must demonstrate that they are prepared to deal 
with the potential for a blowout and worst-case discharge per 
NTL-06. 
• Permit applications for drilling projects must meet new 
standards for well-design, casing, and cementing, and be 
independently certified by a professional engineer per the new 
Drilling Safety Rule. Drilling standards have been strengthened 
in the exploration and development stages, for equipment, 
safety practices, environmental safeguards, and oversight. 
• New guidance, through NTL-10, requires a corporate 
compliance statement and review of subsea blowout 
containment resources for deepwater drilling, a key lesson of 
the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. 
• The bureau announced that they will begin to use multiple-
person inspection teams for offshore oil and gas inspections. 
This internal process improvement will improve oversight and 
help ensure that offshore operations proceed safely and 
responsibly. The new process will allow teams to inspect 
multiple operations simultaneously and thoroughly, and 
enhance the quality of inspections on larger facilities. 
 
 150 Salazar Names Members of Ocean Energy Safety Advisory Committee to Guide Oil and 
Gas Regulatory Program Reform, U.S. DEP’T INTERIOR (Mar. 11, 2011), http://www. 
doi.gov/news/pressreleases/Salazar-Names-Members-of-Ocean-Energy-Safety-Advisory-
Committee-to-Guide-Oil-and-Gas-Regulatory-Program-Reform.cfm; see also Ocean Energy 
Safety Advisory Committee, Notice of Meeting, 76 Fed. Reg. 18,232 (Apr. 1, 2011); 
Establishment of the Ocean Energy Safety Advisory Committee, 76 Fed. Reg. 4,128 (Jan. 
24, 2011); Ocean Energy Safety Advisory Committee, BUREAU SAFETY & ENVTL. 
ENFORCEMENT, http://www.bsee.gov/about-bsee/public-Engagement/OESC/Index/ (last 
visited Jan. 1, 2016); BUREAU OF SAFETY & ENVTL. ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, 
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Enhanced Workplace Safety 
• BSEE imposed, for the first time, requirements that offshore 
operators maintain comprehensive safety and environmental 
programs. This includes performance-based standards for 
offshore drilling and production operations, including 
equipment, safety practices, environmental safeguards, and 
management oversight of operations and contractors. 
Companies will now have to develop and maintain a Safety 
and Environmental Management System (“SEMS”) per the 
new Workplace Safety Rule.151 
In April 2015, BSEE supplemented these efforts by proposing a new 
blowout preventer rule to address the issues that arose with that 
technology during the spill, which Section III.B.3 discusses in depth.152 
Beyond this broadly focused rulemaking, the post-spill reassessment 
— combined with (1) the push to explore increasingly accessible 
Arctic oil and gas and (2) concerns raised by environmental groups 
and some Alaska Native groups — caused the Obama Administration 
to decide to promulgate drilling regulations specifically focused on 
mobile offshore drilling units (“MODUs”) in the planning areas of the 
Arctic Chukchi and Beaufort Seas.153 The rule proposed in February 
2015 would ensure that each operator: 
1. Designs and conducts exploration programs in a manner 
suitable for Arctic OCS [Outer Continental Shelf] conditions; 
2. Develops an integrated operations plan (IOP) that would 
address all phases of its proposed Arctic OCS exploration 
program and submit the IOP to DOI, acting through its 
designee, BOEM, at least 90 days in advance of filing the 
Exploration Plan (EP); 
 
 151 Regulatory Reform, BUREAU SAFETY & ENVTL. ENFORCEMENT, http://www.bsee. 
gov/About-BSEE/BSEE-History/Reforms/Reforms/ (last visited Jan. 1, 2016) (emphasis 
omitted). 
 152 See Oil and Gas and Sulphur Operations in the Outer Continental Shelf — Blowout 
Preventer Systems and Well Control, 80 Fed. Reg. 21504 (proposed Apr. 13, 2015) (to be 
codified at 30 C.F.R. pt. 250), available at http://www.bsee.gov/uploadedFiles/ 
BSEE/Regulations_and_Guidance/Recently_Finalized_Rules/Well_Control_Rule/BSEE%20
2015-08587%20Final%20FR%2004-13-15.pdf [hereinafter Blowout Preventer Rule]. 
 153 See Arctic Drilling Rule, supra note 8.  
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3. Has access to, and the ability to promptly deploy, Source 
Control and Containment Equipment (SCCE) while drilling 
below, or working below, the surface casing; 
4. Has access to a separate relief rig located so that it could 
timely drill a relief well in the event of a loss of well control 
under the conditions expected at the site; 
5. Has the capability to predict, track, report, and respond to 
ice conditions and adverse weather events; 
6. Effectively manages and oversees contractors; and 
7. Develops and implements an Oil Spill Response Plan 
(OSRP) that is designed and executed in a manner suitable for 
the unique Arctic OCS operating environment and has the 
necessary equipment, training, and personnel for oil spill 
response on the Arctic OCS.154 
As discussed in more depth in Section III.C, both this rule and the 
new blowout preventer rule reflect the hybrid quality of governance in 
this context by including standards from transnational standard 
setting entities and approaches from the Arctic Council.155 
Although the new rules described previously include disaster 
planning, the response and spill liability regimes are largely constituted 
separately from efforts to regulate offshore drilling to prevent disaster. 
The federal government responds to major oil spills, such as the BP 
Deepwater Horizon spill, through the National Oil and Hazardous 
Substances Pollution Contingency Plan, often referred to as the National 
Contingency Plan (“NCP”). Several laws help to establish the NCP: the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability 
Act of 1980 (“CERCLA”) as amended by the Superfund Amendments 
and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (“SARA”), the Clean Water Act 
(“CWA”), and the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (“OPA”).156 
 
 154 Id. at 5. 
 155 See infra Part III.C. 
 156 40 C.F.R. § 300.2 (2015). The National Contingency Plan: 
The NCP is required by section 105 of the Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. § 9605, as 
amended by the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 
(SARA), Pub. L. 99–499, (hereinafter CERCLA), and by section 311(d) of 
the Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C. § 1321(d), as amended by the Oil 
Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA), Pub. L. 101–380. In Executive Order (E.O.) 
12777 (56 FR 54757, October 22, 1991), the President delegated to the 
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The NCP, as written, sets up a federally-controlled approach to the 
response with opportunities for involvement and input by key state 
actors. The NCP establishes a national response team of fifteen key 
federal departments and agencies, as well as regional response teams 
that include state and local government representatives.157 An On-
Scene Coordinator leads this response effort under a unified command 
system.158 However, the on-the-ground reality during the BP 
Deepwater Horizon spill response was far more complex, as smaller 
interagency groupings addressed specific issues, such as fisheries and 
dispersants, and state and local governments took independent action 
at times.159 
In addition to addressing the response, the OPA, paired with the 
CWA and other environmental law, establishes a federal framework 
for oil spill liability. However, it does not preempt similar state laws160 
and a number of states have established their own similar liability 
laws, often referred to as mini-OPAs.161 
The long-term spill response to the BP Deepwater Horizon spill 
exemplifies the administrative complexity that would arise in the 
United States if a major spill took place in U.S. Arctic waters. The 
official government website on that spill includes fifteen federal 
partners in the response: Corporation for National and Community 
Service, Department of Agriculture, Department of Defense, 
Department of Energy, Department of Homeland Security, Department 
of the Interior, Department of Justice, Department of Labor, 
Environmental Protection Agency, Health and Human Services, 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, National Oceanic and 
 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) the responsibility for the 
amendment of the NCP. Amendments to the NCP are coordinated with 
members of the National Response Team (NRT) prior to publication for 
notice and comment. This includes coordination with the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission in order to avoid inconsistent or duplicative requirements in 
the emergency planning responsibilities of those agencies. The NCP is 
applicable to response actions taken pursuant to the authorities under 
CERCLA and section 311 of the CWA, as amended. 
Id.  
 157 See id. §§ 300.105(c), .110(a), .175(b) (2015). 
 158 See id. § 300.105(c), (d). 
 159 See Osofsky, Multidimensional Governance, supra note 32, at 1091-93, 1095. 
 160 33 U.S.C. § 2718 (2012). 
 161 For an analysis of these “state mini-OPAs,” see Stanley A. Millan, Escaping the 
“Black Hole” in the Gulf, 24 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 41, 66-67 (2010).  
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Atmospheric Administration, Small Business Administration, Research 
and Innovative Technology Administration, and the White House.162 
These entities work collaboratively with a focus on thirteen areas of 
response and recovery: administration, assistance, data/energy, 
environment, food, health, investigation, military, travel, volunteer, 
weather, wildlife, and workers.163 Moreover, in the context of the 
Arctic, more significant transnational issues may arise given the 
likelihood of a spill traveling into transnational waters, especially 
those of Russia and Canada. 
The many governance arrangements described in this Part — which 
span levels of government and involve both public and private 
authorities and stakeholders — provide a dilemma for those trying to 
improve Arctic offshore oil and gas regulation. Namely, they are 
diverse and diffuse, and could not be supplanted easily by some 
overarching governmental agreement. Effective next steps need to take 
the many relevant entities and their roles into account, which 
constrains simple solutions. The next Part focuses on nascent efforts 
to create needed interconnections among these entities, which can 
serve as a basis for further collaboration. 
III. EMERGING HYBRID COOPERATION 
The previous Part explores the diversity of governance arrangements 
relevant to offshore oil and gas regulation in the Arctic. This Part 
analyzes the implications of that diversity for cooperation in disaster 
prevention and response. It focuses in particular on the hybridity — 
mixed public/private character — of most of the entities addressing oil 
and gas development to propose the value of what it terms “hybrid 
cooperation” in this and other complex governance contexts. As noted 
in the introduction, this form of cooperation involves diverse 
stakeholders at multiple levels of government combining their efforts 
either through creating institutions that bring them together or 
through integrating each other’s work in the agreements and 
regulations that they develop. 
This Part begins in Section A by defining the concept of “hybrid 
cooperation.” Sections B and C then provide case examples of ways in 
 
 162 See Federal Partners by Agency A–Z, RESTORETHEGULF, https://www.restorethegulf. 
gov/coast-guard-response/national-response-team/federal-partners-agency-z (last visited 
Jan. 1, 2016). 
 163 See Federal Partners by Topic A–Z, RESTORETHEGULF, https://www. 
restorethegulf.gov/coast-guard-response/national-response-team/federal-partners-topic-z 
(last visited Feb. 18, 2016). 
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which that cooperation appears in regulatory approaches and 
institutions. The Part concludes with an assessment of the benefits and 
limitations of hybrid cooperation in the Arctic offshore drilling context. 
A. Defining Hybrid Cooperation 
In order to provide a meaningful analysis of the role of hybrid 
cooperation in Arctic energy governance, we must first explain what 
we mean by that term. Such a definition is complicated, however, by 
the many forms that hybrid arrangements take and the overlapping 
but not identical analyses of these kinds of arrangements in the 
scholarly literature. For instance, polycentric governance,164 global 
legal pluralism,165 the New Haven School,166 global administrative 
 
 164 Polycentric governance approaches similarly engage the multi-level, multi-
actor, mixed formal and formal governance dynamics that dominate the Arctic oil and 
gas context. For example, according to political scientist Jan Aart Scholte: 
governance now also involves suprastate (regional and transworld) regimes 
that operate with some autonomy from the state. In addition, many substate 
(municipal and provincial) governments today engage directly with spheres 
beyond their state . . . governance . . . has become distinctly multi-layered 
and cross-cutting. Regulation occurs at — and through interconnections 
among — municipal, provincial, national, regional and global sites . . . . 
Thus in polycentric circumstances no site or level of governance has one-
way sway over the others. 
J.A. Scholte, Globalization and Governance: From Statism to Polycentrism 3, 21 (Ctr. for 
the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation, Working Paper No. 130/04, 2004). 
Elinor Ostrom, Dan Cole, and Hari Osofsky, among others, have applied these ideas of 
polycentric governance in the context of climate change. Elinor Ostrom’s 2009 World 
Bank Research Working Paper, in particular, helped open a broader conversation 
about the need to acknowledge the significance of a wide range of formal and informal 
action beyond the confines of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change. See Elinor Ostrom, A Polycentric Approach for Coping with Climate Change 
(World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper No. 5095, 2009). For an example of 
scholarship building on this approach, see Daniel H. Cole, From Global to Polycentric 
Climate Governance (European Univ. Inst. Robert Schuman Ctr. for Advanced Studies, 
Working Paper No. 2011/30, 2011), available at https://www.researchgate.net/ 
publication/228147855_From_Global_to_Polycentric_Climate_Governance. 
 165 Global legal pluralism explores the multiple normative, and sometimes legal, 
communities operating in shared social space and the navigation of simultaneously 
valid orders. For examples of this approach in a variety of substantive contexts, see 
Robert B. Ahdieh, Dialectical Regulation, 38 CONN. L. REV. 863 (2006); Diane Marie 
Amann, Calling Children to Account: The Proposal for a Juvenile Chamber in the Special 
Court for Sierra Leone, 29 PEPP. L. REV. 167 (2001); Diane Marie Amann, Current 
Debates in the Conflict of Laws: Application of the Constitution to Guantanamo Bay: Abu 
Ghraib, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 2085 (2005); Elena A. Baylis, Parallel Courts in Post-Conflict 
Kosovo, 32 YALE J. INT’L L. 1 (2007); Paul Schiff Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, 80 S. 
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law,167 network theory,168 and reconceptualizations of globalization169 
and indigeneity170 treat a diverse set of multilevel activity as relevant 
 
CAL. L. REV. 1155 (2007); William W. Burke-White, International Legal Pluralism, 25 
MICH. J. INT’L L. 963 (2004); Janet Koven Levit, A Bottom-Up Approach to International 
Lawmaking: The Tale of Three Trade Finance Instruments, 30 YALE J. INT’L L. 125 (2005); 
Ralf Michaels, The Re-state-ment of Non-State Law: The State, Choice of Law, and the 
Challenge from Global Legal Pluralism, 51 WAYNE L. REV. 1209 (2005). For Hari 
Osofsky’s examination of pluralism in the context of climate change litigation, see 
Hari M. Osofsky, Climate Change Litigation as Pluralist Legal Dialogue?, 26 STAN. 
ENVTL. L.J. 181 (2007) [hereinafter Climate Change]. For an exploration of property 
rights in the context of legal pluralism, see Ruth S. Meinzen-Dick & Rajendra 
Pradhan, Legal Pluralism and Dynamic Property Rights (Int’l Food Policy Research 
Inst., CAPRi Working Paper No. 22, 2002), available at http://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/ 
dlc/handle/10535/4231. 
 166 The New Haven School treats law as “a process of authoritative decision by 
which the members of a community clarify and secure their common interests.” 
HAROLD D. LASSWELL & MYRES S. MCDOUGAL, JURISPRUDENCE FOR A FREE SOCIETY: 
STUDIES IN LAW, SCIENCE AND POLICY, at xxi (1992); accord Myres S. McDougal et al., 
The World Community: A Planetary Social Process, 21 UC DAVIS L. REV. 807, 810-11 
(1988). For a discussion of the New Haven School’s goals, see LASSWELL & MCDOUGAL, 
supra, at xxix. Ideas of new governance and polycentric governance share much in 
common with a variety of interdisciplinary approaches to legal pluralism, which in 
turn have much in common with the New Haven School, in that they all have a broad 
conception of lawmaking that incorporates a diverse set of activity. See Osofsky, 
Climate Change, supra note 165, at 184. Under such models, the wide range of 
activities trying to establish unconventional energy standards can be treated as part of 
a lawmaking process that also incorporates formal treaty processes and accompanying 
national legislation and regulation. 
 167 For an analysis of key principles of global administrative law, see Benedict 
Kingsbury et al., The Emergence of Global Administrative Law, 68 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
15 (2005). 
 168 Considerable scholarly literature across several disciplines explores the role of 
networks in governance, which is relevant to this context because many of the key 
stakeholders in the Arctic relate to one another through a variety of networks. For 
instance, the intersection of international law, international relations, and 
transgovernmentalism examines how relationships among a range of governmental 
and nongovernmental entities shape international governance. Anne-Marie Slaughter’s 
A New World Order, for example, describes vertical and horizontal networks of 
governmental officials interacting with one another and with disaggregated 
international organizations. See ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 18-23 
(2004). At the intersection of urban studies and geography, Saskia Sassen has explored 
how economic globalization and the emergence of new information and 
communication technologies have established world cities as key nodes for cross-
border networks and resource concentration. See Saskia Sassen, Locating Cities on 
Global Circuits, 14 ENV’T & URBANIZATION 13 (2002), available at http://eau.sagepub. 
com/content/14/1/13.full.pdf. In the political geography scale literature, Kevin Cox 
has argued that different scales are themselves networks, focusing in particular on 
local spaces as comprised both of core local interactions and multi-level ones. See 
Kevin R. Cox, Spaces of Dependence, Spaces of Engagement and the Politics of Scale, or: 
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Looking for Local Politics, 17 POL. GEOGRAPHY 1, 2 (1998). At the intersection of law 
and anthropology, Annelise Riles has described the role of multilevel networks as 
Fijian activists and bureaucrats prepared for and then participated in the United 
Nations Fourth World Conference on Women. See ANNELISE RILES, THE NETWORK 
INSIDE OUT (2000). Hari Osofsky, using a law and geography approach, has considered 
the role of networks of cities in climate change governance. See, e.g., Hari M. Osofsky, 
Multiscalar Governance and Climate Change: Reflections on the Role of States and Cities 
at Copenhagen, 25 MD. J. INT’L L. 64 (2010); Hari M. Osofsky, Rethinking the Geography 
of Local Climate Action: Multilevel Network Participation in Metropolitan Regions, 2015 
UTAH L. REV. 173 [hereinafter Rethinking]; Hari M. Osofsky, Suburban Climate Change 
Efforts: Possibilities for Small and Nimble Cities Participating in State, Regional, National, 
and International Networks, 22 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 395 (2012); Hari M. Osofsky 
& Janet Koven Levit, The Scale of Networks?: Local Climate Change Coalitions, 8 CHI. J. 
INT’L L. 409 (2008). While each of these accounts has a distinct focus and orientation, 
a common thread running through them is their analysis of the way in which 
interactions at multiple levels both inside and outside of the formal confines of law 
formation help to constitute governance. 
 169 A number of political scientists, geographers, legal scholars, and sociologists 
rethink traditional notions of sovereignty and the state as the center of analysis. See, 
e.g., JENS BARTLESON, A GENEALOGY OF SOVEREIGNTY (1995); STATE SOVEREIGNTY AS 
SOCIAL CONSTRUCT (Thomas J. Biersteker & Cynthia Weber eds., 1996); John Agnew, 
Sovereignty Regimes: Territoriality and State Authority in Contemporary World Politics, 
95 ANNALS ASSOC. AM. GEOGRAPHERS 437 (2005); Mathias Albert & Lothar Brock, 
What Keeps the Westphalia Together? Normative Differentiation in the Modern System of 
States, in IDENTITIES, BORDERS, ORDERS: RETHINKING INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY 
29 (Mathias Albert et al. eds., 2001); Noel Castree, Differential Geographies: Place, 
Indigenous Rights and “Local” Resources, 23 POL. GEOGRAPHY 133 (2004). Some of these 
analyses focus on multilevel governance. See MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE (Ian Bache & 
Matthew Flinders, eds. 2004).  
 170 For instance, geographer Noel Castree has looked at how indigenous groups 
have constructed new ways of thinking about political relationships to land that go 
beyond traditional considerations of state sovereignty. See Castree, supra note 169, at 
156. According to Castree, indigeneity is “both a reaction to and an embrace of 
translocal connectivity . . . or [globalization].” Id. (emphasis omitted). International 
Relations (“IR”) scholar Jessica Shadian likewise contends that traditional notions of 
Westphalian sovereignty — in which sovereign and equal nation states create 
international law through binding agreements — are now ceding space to newer ideas 
of quasi non-state sovereignty. The Inuit through the Inuit Circumpolar Council 
(“ICC”), for instance, have attained a form of cultural sovereignty (i.e. cultural 
integrity), rather than state sovereignty (territorial integrity), affording Inuit the 
authority to participate formally in global politics. See SHADIAN, ARCTIC SOVEREIGNTY, 
supra note 67, at 12-16, 196; Jessica Shadian, From States to Polities: Reconceptualizing 
Sovereignty Through Inuit Governance, 16 EUROPEAN J. INT’L REL. 485, 493 (2010). IR 
theorist Karena Shaw also focuses on the impact of indigenous politics on our 
traditional understandings of sovereignty and the state. According to Shaw, 
indigenous struggles are our problems, not because they are our fault, but because of 
the implications those struggles have for understanding our own identities. Karena 
Shaw, Indigeneity and the International, 31 MILLENNIUM: J. INT’L REL. STUD. 55, 58-59 
(2002). If we want to understand current world politics, Shaw argues, and so “shift 
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to lawmaking processes. New governance,171 regulatory institutions,172 
and adaptive management173 theories explore mechanisms for 
 
[our] exploration of the diverse spatial, temporal, and discursive conditions under 
which forms of authority are being constituted, enabled and authorised today,” then 
we need to move the center of our analysis from ontologically given assumptions 
about authority to the ontological conditions of possibility. See id. at 79. Legal scholar 
Natalia Loukacheva has written about the legalities of the Inuit land claims 
agreements. According to her, they are creating new conceptions of autonomy that she 
refers to as “constitutional hybrids.” See NATALIA LOUKACHEVA, THE ARCTIC PROMISE: 
LEGAL AND POLITICAL AUTONOMY OF GREENLAND AND NUNAVUT 145 (2007); see also 
Marshall Beier, Forgetting, Remembering, and Finding Indigenous Peoples in International 
Relations, in INDIGENOUS DIPLOMACIES 11 (J. Marshall Beier., ed., 2009). 
 171 New governance scholars have written — most relevantly — about ways to 
reconceptualize the traditional practices of environmental regulation and natural 
resource management to meet the changing nature of resource rights, ownership, and 
use. Rather than relying upon traditional top-down regulatory models, these scholars 
focus on the need to take into account the various levels of governance and 
multiplicity of stakeholders. Professors Kenneth W. Abbot and Duncan Snidal have 
outlined four core attributes of new governance approaches across various substantive 
contexts: (1) state-orchestrated instead of state-centered; (2) decentralized instead of 
centralized; (3) based on dispersed instead of bureaucratic expertise; and (4) 
integrating a mixture of hard and soft law instead of focusing only on mandatory 
rules. See Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Strengthening International Regulation 
Through Transnational New Governance: Overcoming the Orchestration Deficit, 42 VAND. 
J. TRANSNAT’L L. 501, 508-09 (2009). For additional examples of new governance 
scholarship, see LAW AND NEW GOVERNANCE IN THE EU AND THE US (Gráinne de Búrca 
& Joanne Scott eds., 2006); Bradley C. Karkkainen, Reply, “New Governance” in Legal 
Thought and in the World: Some Splitting as Antidote to Overzealous Lumping, 89 MINN. 
L. REV. 471 (2004) [hereinafter New Governance]; Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall 
of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. 
REV. 342 (2004); Orly Lobel, Surreply, Setting the Agenda for New Governance Research, 
89 MINN. L. REV. 498 (2004); J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Climate Change, Dead Zones, 
and Massive Problems in the Administrative State: A Guide for Whittling Away, 98 CALIF. 
L. REV. 59 (2010). According to Bradley Karkkainen, who has developed new 
governance approaches in an environmental context most relevant here, the 
traditional model of environmental protection which materialized in the 1960s 
assumes that an expert decision maker — the regulatory agency which was an arm of 
the state — would identify the most important environmental problems, gather 
sufficient expert information to specify effective solutions, express those solutions as a 
series of specific legally binding commands, and finally enforce those commands by 
employing the coercive sanctioning power of the state. See Karkkainen, New 
Governance, supra, at 473-74. Jessica Shadian explains that new governance 
approaches to resource management also aim to deal with the fact that often resource 
management is controlled equally by states and various non-state actors including 
private companies. Shadian further recognizes: 
that the competences of varying actors are multilayered among mission-
specific agencies and are dispersed over various tiers of government.  
. . . Non-state actors . . . are not considered merely as stakeholders, or 
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developing more inclusive, responsive, and decentralized governance 
approaches. Dynamic federalism174 also analyzes the development and 
structures of multilevel governance, generally in more domestic 
contexts. We draw in particular from a conception of hybrid 
governance that Hari Osofsky developed with Hannah Wiseman in the 
U.S. domestic energy context, though modified somewhat to reflect 
the particular characteristics of the Arctic.175 Although these 
conceptualizations vary significantly from one another, they all 
 
consultants, epistemic communities or lobbyists to the sovereign authority 
(for example a federal or city government). [Rather, they comprise part of 
the governance arrangement.] The state, as such, is often forced to engage 
“in an open-ended effort at collaborative problem-solving” with non-state 
actors in order to utilize their expertise and resources. 
Jessica M. Shadian, Of Whales and Oil: Inuit Resource Governance and the Arctic Council, 
49 POLAR REC. 392, 394 (2013) [hereinafter Of Whales and Oil] (citation omitted). 
 172 For examples of regulatory institutions theory, see Valerie Braithwaite, Ten 
Things You Need to Know About Regulation and Never Wanted to Ask, 14 AUSTL. L. LIBR. 
19 (2006); Charlotte Wood et al., Applications of Responsive Regulatory Theory in 
Australia and Overseas (Reg. Inst. Network, Occasional Paper No. 15, 2010), available 
at http://regnet.anu.edu.au/research/publications/3097/no-15-applications-responsive-
regulatory-theory-australia-and-overseas. 
 173 Adaptive management, at times drawing from concepts of panarchy, see C.S. 
Holling et al., In Quest of a Theory of Adaptive Change, in PANARCHY: UNDERSTANDING 
TRANSFORMATIONS IN HUMAN AND NATURAL SYSTEMS 3, 5 (Lance H. Gunderson & C.S. 
Holling eds., 2002), explores how law can be structured to allow for regulatory 
evolution in response to change. See, e.g., Alejandro E. Camacho, Assisted Migration: 
Redefining Nature and Natural Resource Law Under Climate Change, 27 YALE J. ON REG. 
171 (2010); Robin Kundis Craig, “Stationarity Is Dead” — Long Live Transformation: 
Five Principles for Climate Change Adaptation Law, 34 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 9 (2010); 
Michael Ilg, Complexity, Environment, and Equitable Competition: A Theory of Adaptive 
Rule Design, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. 647 (2010); Bradley C. Karkkainen, Default Rules in 
Private and Public Law: Extending Default Rules Beyond Purely Economic Relationships: 
Information-Forcing Environmental Regulation, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 861 (2006); J.B. 
Ruhl & Robert L. Fischman, Adaptive Management in the Courts, 95 MINN. L. REV. 424 
(2010); J.B. Ruhl, Law’s Complexity: A Primer, 24 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 885 (2008); Sandra 
Zellmer, Essay, A Tale of Two Imperiled Rivers: Reflections from a Post-Katrina World, 
59 FLA. L. REV. 599 (2007). 
 174 In the U.S. domestic law context, an extensive and rapidly growing dynamic 
federalism literature complements this scholarship through its analysis of how to 
structure appropriate and effective multi-level governance structures. See Kirsten H. 
Engel, Harnessing the Benefits of Dynamic Federalism in Environmental Law, 56 EMORY 
L.J. 159, 160 (2006). For Hari Osofsky’s extensive summary and synthesis of this 
literature in the context of climate change, see Hari M. Osofsky, Diagonal Federalism 
and Climate Change: Implications for the Obama Administration, 62 ALA. L. REV. 237, 
269-72, 276, 281 (2011). 
 175 See Hari M. Osofsky & Hannah J. Wiseman, Hybrid Energy Governance, 2014 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 1, 1-2. 
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develop multipolar governance models that include a wide range of 
stakeholders, which we view as crucial for the Arctic context, given its 
governance complexity. 
This Article builds on these theories and the earlier work of Osofsky 
and Wiseman to develop a conceptual approach for what we term 
“hybrid cooperation.” Hybrid cooperation focuses on how a variety of 
public and private stakeholders — including indigenous peoples and 
corporations, among others — are actively contributing to new norms 
and governance structures for Arctic offshore drilling. We focus in 
particular on three key characteristics that we treat as fundamental to 
hybrid cooperation: 
(1) Hybrid cooperation involves more than one type of key 
stakeholder. 
Hybrid cooperation, whether in the text of a regulation or in the 
form of an agreement, involves multiple key actors relying on one 
another or interacting with one another in some fashion. Involving 
more than one key stakeholder is crucial to hybrid cooperation serving 
as a mechanism for addressing fragmentation. 
(2) Hybrid cooperation bridges the public-private divide. 
In order to be hybrid in this model, regulations or institutions must 
involve both public (or at least quasi-public) and private actors. In 
most instances, they include some mix of governmental and corporate 
entities. In one instance, they involve governmentally constituted 
Alaska Native corporations and transnational corporations. 
(3) Hybrid cooperation creates new alignment or coordination. 
Hybrid cooperation does not require explicitly cooperative behavior, 
but it must create progress in entities working in a coordinated fashion, 
whether that entails using one another’s standards or actually working 
together. This requirement helps to ensure that regulations and 
institutions categorized in this way actually move cooperation forward. 
What sets our idea of hybrid cooperation apart from much of the 
above scholarly literature is that many of those writings focus on 
decentralized institutions and processes that include a wide range of 
stakeholders, without considering regulatory incorporation.176 
Similarly, the scholarship on regulatory incorporation does not tend to 
focus as much on institution building.177 We argue that a more 
inclusive view of hybrid cooperation that includes both forms provides 
 
 176 See supra notes 161–67 and accompanying text. 
 177 See id. 
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an important mechanism for developing systematic strategies for 
addressing the governance fragmentation in the Arctic offshore 
drilling context. The Article adds to the literature on hybrid 
governance in creating a model of hybrid cooperation that includes 
not only emerging institutions that bring together non-state actors and 
varying levels of governments, but also regulatory developments that 
incorporate rules, regulations, and standards of other entities 
(standard setting organizations, regional regimes, indigenous legal 
infrastructures, domestic law, etc.). The following diagram illustrates 
these two primary categories of hybrid cooperation we examine in the 
paper, organized from strongest to weakest levels of cooperation. 
 
 
The sections that follow examine several examples to illustrate how 
hybrid cooperation is working in practice. Although these two 
categories are not entirely distinct — regulatory incorporation can 
create institutions, for example — we have grouped them by what we 
view as the dominant form that they represent. For regulatory 
incorporation, Section III.B considers the Arctic Council’s 2015 
Framework Plan for Cooperation on Prevention of Oil Pollution from 
Petroleum and Maritime Activities in the Marine Areas of the Arctic, 
and PAME’s 2014 Arctic Offshore Oil and Gas Guidelines: System 
Safety Management and Safety Culture. The section also dissects the 
Obama Administration’s 2015 proposed Requirements for Exploratory 
Drilling on the Arctic Outer Continental Shelf and proposed blowout 
preventer regulations. Each of these developments provides examples 
of strong regulatory incorporation, in which standards created by 
industry organizations or standard setting bodies are directly 
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incorporated into the documents. The section also highlights the 
Obama Administration’s inclusion of Arctic Council approaches in its 
Arctic drilling regulations, and efforts across the documents to 
reference the involvement of key stakeholders.178 
With respect to institutional collaboration, Section III.C considers 
three examples: the Arctic Inupiat Offshore, LCC (“AIO”), Regional 
Citizens Advisory Councils (“RCACs”), and the Arctic Waterways 
Safety Committee (“AWSC”). AIO is a new company that brought 
together Alaska Native corporations, the Arctic Slope Regional 
Corporation and six North Slope village corporations in anticipation 
of Shell Oil’s Chukchi Sea drilling project. Shell Oil and AIO “entered 
into a binding agreement that will allow AIO the option to acquire an 
interest in Shell’s acreage and activities on its Chukchi Sea leases. This 
interest will be managed by AIO.”179 The agreement largely focuses on 
shared economic benefits, but also provides opportunities for Alaska 
Native input into resource management in this context. Although this 
particular collaboration is obviously significantly undermined in the 
near term by Shell Oil’s decision to pull out of the Chukchi Sea, it 
provides an interesting model for collaboration between Alaska Native 
corporations and transnational oil and gas corporations. The other two 
examples involve federally-created entities that bring stakeholders 
together to provide input into safety. RCACs were formed in the 
aftermath of the Exxon Valdez spill, and focus on spill prevention and 
responses in two communities. AWSC was constituted by the Coast 
Guard, and allows diverse stakeholders to provide input into waterway 
transport safety.180 
The Article’s approach acknowledges that cooperation is not always 
achieved through explicit agreements among key stakeholders, in part 
because there is simply too much simultaneous activity for full 
coordination and in part because the existing governmental structures 
often limit participation. The participatory processes taking place 
under the auspices of the Arctic Council, described in Section III.B.1, 
are the closest to the fullest form of hybrid cooperation in the Arctic 
offshore oil and gas contexts. Although the Arctic Council gives 
greater status to nation-states than other participants, its working 
groups often involve private actors and they always involve the six 
 
 178 See infra Part III.B. 
 179 Press Release, Arctic Slope Reg’l Corp., ASRC, North Slope Village Corporations and 
Shell Announce Historic Venture (July 31, 2014) [hereinafter ASRC Press Release], 
available at http://www.asrc.com/PressReleases/Pages/Arctic-Inupiat-Offshore.aspx. 
 180 See infra Part III.C.3. 
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permanent indigenous representatives.181 Even there, though, the 
proceedings do not fully encapsulate the many activities described in 
Part II and all of the key actors.182 
Moreover, the multi-stakeholder processes at the Arctic Council 
represent only a small fraction of the diverse types of collaboration 
emerging in the Arctic, a few of which are explored by this Part. These 
individual examples of hybrid cooperation are important because they 
collectively help to constitute more integrated regional governance 
amid complexity and fragmentation. In the context of Arctic offshore 
energy governance, we are witnessing the early onset and creation of 
new norms for offshore oil and gas development. These norms are 
being structured by Arctic Council efforts, pre-existing domestic laws, 
Arctic regional-level knowledge exchange regarding these domestic 
rules and procedures, U.S. and global responses by governmental, 
inter-governmental, and nongovernmental entities to the BP Deepwater 
Horizon disaster and the earlier Exxon Valdez spill, and broader 
transitions in the energy system and in understandings of the Arctic.183 
 
 181 See supra Part II.B. 
 182 Working Group Management Boards generally include representatives from Arctic 
Members States’ national governmental agencies and Permanent Participant 
representatives. Working Groups, ARCTIC COUNCIL, http://www.arctic-council.org/ 
index.php/en/about-us/working-groups (last updated Sept. 10, 2015). Representative of 
observer states and organizations participate to some extent, as do invited experts and 
guests. Id. In addition, the Permanent Participant structure does not provide full 
representation of Arctic indigenous peoples. Although the Ottawa Declaration establishing 
the Arctic Council allows for additional Permanent Participants, it requires that these 
“organizations of Arctic indigenous peoples” have a “majority Arctic indigenous 
constituency” that either represents “a single indigenous people resident in more than one 
Arctic state” or “more than one Arctic indigenous people resident in a single Arctic state.” 
Arctic Council, Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council, Ottawa, Canada, 
Sept. 19, 1996, art. 2, available at https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/bitstream/handle/ 
11374/85/00_ottawa_decl_1996_signed%20%284%29.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y. 
These requirements mean that it would be difficult for all Arctic indigenous peoples with 
their diversity of viewpoints will be fully represented through the Permanent Participant 
structure. For an analysis of participation gaps faced by indigenous peoples in international 
law and the extent to which the Permanent Participant structure serves as a model, see 
Timo Koivurova & Leena Heinämäki, The Participation of Indigenous Peoples in 
International Norm-making in the Arctic, 42 POLAR RECORD 101 (2006).  
 183 Generally speaking, the Arctic is increasingly understood as a political rather 
than solely physical region. This emerging understanding includes the recognition 
that the Arctic is inhabited by many indigenous and other communities, and 
accompanying that recognition is the fact that there are many well-established 
governance mechanisms already in place. SHADIAN, ARCTIC SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 
67, at 85-88, 196. 
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The following sections demonstrate how hybrid cooperation has been 
operationalized at multiple scales and in different contexts. The case 
studies demonstrate that fundamentally fragmented governance 
structures in the Arctic offshore drilling context may be mitigated by 
these types of regulatory approaches and institutions. Although each 
example represents only one aspect of regulatory governance in this 
context, they collectively provide models for how greater cooperation 
can be achieved moving forward. The examples described in the 
following sections thus form part of a mosaic of hybrid Arctic energy 
“cooperations” — a developing, interconnected web-like governance 
system where no one authority dominates.184 A nascent regional 
governance approach is emerging as multiple institutions begin 
simultaneously to create regulations and varying forms of soft law (from 
best practices and standards to recommendations) and these regulations 
and soft law tools themselves directly borrow from one another. 
B. Regulatory Incorporation 
This section explores three examples of transnational and national 
regulatory efforts including standards by or inclusion of other key 
stakeholders. The first involves cooperation built into Arctic Council 
documents regarding offshore oil and gas safety. The second two 
consider ways in which federal regulations emerging with respect to 
offshore drilling generally and in the Arctic context in particular 
incorporate efforts by transnational entities and standard setting 
bodies. The incorporation of these participatory processes and public 
and private transnational regulatory mechanisms exemplifies the mix 
of explicit and implicit cooperation being built into regional planning 
and domestic laws in this context. 
1. Arctic Council Framework Plan and Working Group Guidelines 
The Arctic Council, as discussed in Part II, provides numerous ways 
for key actors to participate, especially through permanent participant 
status for representatives of indigenous peoples and the working 
groups. These opportunities do not generally include, though, direct 
participation by specific local indigenous communities, or other Arctic 
 
 184 The idea of a mosaic is borrowed from Oran Young 2005. Not referring 
specifically to offshore oil and gas development, Young’s article discusses the post-
Cold War regional governance changes in the Arctic which he refers to as an emerging 
mosaic. See Oran R. Young, Governing the Arctic: From Cold War Theater to Mosaic of 
Cooperation, 11 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 9, 9-10 (2005). 
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subnational regions, governments, or institutions. However, in the 
Arctic Council’s latest efforts to cooperate in the area of preventing oil 
pollution disasters through the 2015 Framework Plan for Cooperation 
on Prevention of Oil Pollution from Petroleum and Maritime Activities 
in the Marine Areas of the Arctic (“2015 Framework Plan”), there is a 
more concerted effort to include key stakeholders. 
The recognition of the hybrid quality of efforts to address offshore 
drilling safety begins with the declarations at the beginning of the 
plan. A series of declarations acknowledges the important roles of the 
International Maritime Organization; “indigenous peoples, 
communities, and local and regional authorities”; several Arctic 
Council working groups that include diverse stakeholders; “the World 
Meteorological Organization; the International Hydrographic 
Organization, specifically, the Arctic Regional Hydrographic 
Commission; and the Intergovernmental Oceanographic 
Commission.”185 The agreement reinforces its incorporation of key 
actors in its statement of its objective: “to strengthen cooperation, 
including exchange of information, among the Participants in the field 
of prevention of marine oil pollution in order to protect the Arctic 
marine environment.”186 
More importantly, these key actors are also integrated into the 
implementation provisions. For example, in Section 1.6.2, the 
Framework Plan explicitly focuses on private sector cooperation: “The 
Participants intend — where possible, and in accordance with their 
national legislation (laws and regulations) and, as appropriate, policies 
— to cooperate with the private sector in order to improve standards 
and best practices for the prevention of the pollution of the Arctic 
marine environment by oil.”187 In numerous sections, the Framework 
Plan references standard setting and the need to cooperate and assess 
standards, which at times explicitly mentions “industry standards.”188 
The 2015 Framework Plan builds on the ongoing efforts of the 
PAME working group, which involves a broader group of stakeholders 
in its processes than the Council meetings themselves. As discussed in 
Part II, PAME has been developing offshore oil and gas safety 
guidelines for a number of years. Its 2014 Arctic Offshore Oil and Gas 
Guidelines: System Safety Management and Safety Culture (“2014 
Guidelines”) contain numerous provisions that involve cooperation 
 
 185 ARCTIC COUNCIL, FRAMEWORK PLAN FOR COOPERATION, supra note 98. 
 186 Id. § 1.1. 
 187 Id. § 1.6.2. 
 188 Id. § 3.2.5; see also id. § 2.2. 
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among industry operators and regulators; include indigenous peoples 
in risk management efforts; and incorporate the work of standard 
setting organizations. 
With respect to industry, one of the 2014 Guidelines’ 
recommendations regarding the development of Arctic standards and 
best practices is for private industry and public regulators to “work 
together to initiate, implement, monitor, and continuously improve 
standards and best practices for safety management systems and safety 
culture in Arctic offshore oil and gas operations.”189 The document 
also focuses on safety management and culture, noting that “regulators 
must define and communicate expectations regarding positive safety 
culture and require operators to establish, implement, and improve 
their safety culture.”190 Recommended actions include requiring 
“operators to have a verifiable process to improve safety culture 
through constant monitoring and assessment and the use of leading 
indicators” and “to designate a responsible and accountable person 
(preferably the CEO) for their safety culture.”191 
The 2014 Guidelines specifies nine safety management categories192 
and its explication of those categories often includes direct references 
to the interactions between industry and regulators. For example, with 
respect to the category of continuous improvement, the guidelines 
state: “Continuous improvement in offshore performance should be 
seen as a collaborative activity requiring cooperation and actions by 
both industry and regulators.”193 Similarly, most of the recommended 
actions for risk assessment rely upon operators providing information 
to regulators.194 And collaborative approaches for management of 
 
 189 ARCTIC COUNCIL, ARCTIC OFFSHORE OIL AND GAS GUIDELINES: SYSTEM SAFETY 
MANAGEMENT AND SAFETY CULTURE 13 (Mar. 2014), available at http://oaarchive.arctic-
council.org/bitstream/handle/11374/418/Systems%20Safety%20Management%20and%
20Safety%20Culture%20report.pdf. 
 190 Id. at 19. 
 191 Id. at 19-20. 
 192 These categories include: (1) continuous improvement, (2) risk 
assessment/hazard identification, (3) management of change, (4) training and 
competence for the Arctic, (5) accountability and responsibility, (6) operating 
procedures, (7) quality assurance/mechanical integrity, (8) documentation and 
reporting, and (9) communications. See id. at 21-34. 
 193 Id. at 22. The 2014 Guidelines also state: Continuous improvement also should 
involve “open and frequent communication with the operator about how to improve 
their performance when deficiencies are identified.” Id. 
 194 Some examples include: (1) “Requir[ing] operators to assess risk in offshore 
Arctic areas on an ongoing basis. Factors include: Geology in the well including 
shallow gas, permafrost and methane hydrates; Weather, sea, ice; and Improvement in 
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change, in addition to having regulators require operators to take a 
variety of safety steps, include a mutual improvement process: 
“Regulators and operators must constantly seek to improve their 
approach to the ‘Management of Change’ through hazard 
identification, risk analysis/assessment and better handling of any 
changes to the drilling plan during the operational phase.”195 
The Guidelines also directly acknowledge the important role of 
indigenous peoples in helping to ensure safe operations and the need 
to incorporate evolving standards created by multiple public and 
private entities. For example, the operating procedures section notes: 
“Consultation with local and indigenous communities with respect to 
weather, sea state, ice, temperature and sensitive ecological conditions 
can also provide a valuable additional source of information for 
assessing overall safety and environmental risk.”196 That section also 
references standard setting by the ISO, new U.S. standards, and an 
Arctic Council taskforce as important in the context of establishing 
operating procedures.197 
Both the 2015 Framework Plan and 2014 Guidelines could go 
further, however, in how they incorporate key actors into 
implementation. Indigenous peoples, for example, are only mentioned 
directly in the declarations and not in the implementation sections of 
the 2015 Framework Plan. Yet even with these limitations, they serve 
as a helpful example of how international agreements among nation-
states and more informal work taking place under them can 
acknowledge and include important non-nation-state actors, 
something that numerous agreements in multiple contexts are 
increasingly doing.198 This incorporation of stakeholders helps to 
acknowledge the complex nature of governance in this context and 
encourage needed cooperation. 
 
the management of change.” Id. at 24. (2) “Requir[ing] the operator to regularly assess 
risk relevant to operating in Arctic conditions in order to inform the process of 
improving regulations, standards and industry guidance.” Id. (3) “Require the 
operator to assess risks associated with cold environment technologies so that safety 
performance can be improved before breakdowns or accidents happen.” Id. 
 195 Id. at 26-27. 
 196 Id. at 30. 
 197 Id.  
 198 For example, the agreements made at the Conferences of the Parties under the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change increasingly include 
subnational actors in their provisions. Osofsky, Rethinking, supra note 168. 
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2. Proposed Rule on Arctic Offshore Drilling 
The Obama Administration’s Arctic-specific drilling rule proposed 
by the BSEE in February 2015 mentions the Arctic Council and efforts 
by standard setting bodies in multiple places. Its references to the 
Arctic Council arise in its discussion of the National Strategy for the 
Arctic Region (“National Arctic Strategy”) issued by President Obama 
in May 2013. The proposed rule explains that the “National Arctic 
Strategy is an example of the types of action the U.S. is taking to 
implement its obligations under international agreements, such as the 
Arctic Council’s Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution 
Preparedness and Response in the Arctic.”199 Of particular significance 
is that in this context the United States treats the Arctic Council 
agreement as an international agreement, acknowledging obligations 
for the United States despite the body’s soft law status. 
The proposed rule also addresses many recommendations made in 
recent reports on OCS oil and gas activities, including ones by the 
Arctic Council. Examples include: 
the Arctic Council, Arctic Offshore Oil and Gas Guidelines 
(2009); the National Commission on the BP Deepwater 
Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling (2011); Ocean Energy 
Safety Advisory Committee Recommendations (2013); DOI’s 
60-Day Report (2013); the Working Group’s report entitled, 
“Managing for the Future in a Rapidly Changing Arctic, A 
Report to the President” (March 2013); the National Arctic 
Strategy (May 2013); and the Arctic Council, Arctic Offshore 
Oil and Gas Guidelines: Systems Safety Management and 
Safety Culture (March 2014).200 
Article 4 of the Arctic Council’s Agreement on Cooperation on 
Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic is 
specifically mentioned in the proposed rule, which notes that “for 
‘areas of special ecological significance,’ each party ‘shall establish a 
minimum level of pre-positioned oil spill combating equipment, 
commensurate with the risk involved, and programs for its use.’”201 
In addition, the new § 250.473(a) is interlinked with Arctic Council 
approaches in its requirement “that all equipment and materials 
proposed for use in exploratory drilling operations on the Arctic OCS 
 
 199 Arctic Drilling Rule, supra note 8, at 10. 
 200 Id. at 33-34. 
 201 Id. at 89. 
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be rated or de-rated for service under conditions that could be 
reasonably expected during operations.”202 The new requirement is 
based on recommendations from a 2009 Arctic Council report.203 
Beyond harmonizing the U.S. approach with that of the Arctic 
Council, the proposed rule explicitly incorporates standards for 
transnational industry and standard setting bodies. For example, the 
proposed rule would add subsection (h)(89) to existing § 250.198 to 
incorporate the American Petroleum Institute (“API”) proposed draft 
Recommended Practice (“RP”) 2N, Recommended Practice for Planning, 
Designing, and Constructing Structures and Pipelines for Arctic 
Conditions, Third Edition as a voluntary consensus standard. 
This API document — which is virtually identical to a 
standard previously issued by the International Organization 
for Standardization (ISO), “Petroleum and Natural Gas 
Industries Arctic Offshore Structures,” First Edition (2010) 
(ISO 19906) — would be appropriate for certain aspects of 
drilling operations, such as accounting for the severe weather 
and thermal effects on structures, maintenance procedures, 
and safety.204 
Paragraph (g) of § 250.470 would require operators to “explain how 
they utilized API RP 2N, Third Edition, in planning their Arctic OCS 
exploratory drilling operations.”205 
The BSEE is seeking comments concerning incorporation of API RP 
2N and is also considering ISO 19906 and 19905-1 as alternatives.206 It 
indicates in the proposed rule that: 
ISO 19905-1 may be better suited than API RP 2N (or ISO 
19906) to guide structural components for jack-up rigs. The 
API RP 2N (or ISO 19906) and ISO 19905-1 documents 
together would provide the most comprehensive structural 
requirements for the use of a jack-up rig in Arctic 
conditions.207 
 
 202 Id. at 100. 
 203 “The Arctic Council made similar recommendations for equipment and 
materials in its 2009 report on Arctic oil and gas operations.” Id. at 101. 
 204 Id. at 66. 
 205 Id. at 77, 85. 
 206 Id. at 88. 
 207 Id. at 89. 
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This consideration of multiple entities’ efforts in this context 
represents an interesting example of how regulations can use and 
evaluate industry standards. 
3. Proposed Rule on Blowout Preventer Systems and Well Control 
Efforts to incorporate industry standards and involve industry are 
not limited to the Arctic offshore drilling regulatory context. The 
Obama Administration’s December 2014 proposed regulations on 
Blowout Preventer Systems, which are key spill containment 
mechanisms that failed during the BP Deepwater Horizon spill, 
demonstrate similar dynamics with respect to offshore drilling more 
broadly in U.S. domestic law. 
Many standards in the proposed rule are based on API ones.208 The 
proposed rule explicitly incorporates API Standard 53 — Blowout 
Prevention Equipment Systems for Drilling Wells;209API 
Recommended Practice 2RD — Design of Risers for Floating 
Production Systems and Tension-Leg Platforms;210API Specification 
Q1 — Specification for Quality Management System Requirements for 
Manufacturing Organizations for the Petroleum and Natural Gas 
Industry;211API Specification 6A — Specification for Wellhead and 
Christmas Tree Equipment;212 American National Standards Institute 
(“ANSI”)/API Specification 11D1 — Packers and Bridge Plugs;213 
ANSI/API Specification 16A — Specification for Drill-through 
 
 208 See Blowout Preventer Rule, supra note 152, at 12. Some of the API standards 
may be accessed for free and some which require a fee. If API standards are 
incorporated into the final rule, the public could inspect or obtain the documents 
through the BSEE or the National Archives and Records Administration (“NARA”). Id. 
 209 “This standard is to provide requirements for the installation and testing of 
blowout prevention equipment systems whose primary functions are to confine well 
fluids to the wellbore, provide means to add fluid to the wellbore, and allow 
controlled volumes to be removed from the wellbore.” Id. at 13. 
 210 “This document addresses structural analysis procedures, design guidelines, 
component selection criteria, and typical designs for all new riser systems used on 
Floating Production Systems (FPSs and Tension-Leg Platforms (TLPs)).” Id. at 14. 
 211 “This specification establishes the minimum quality management system 
requirements for organizations that manufacture products or provide manufacturing-
related processes under a product specification for use in the petroleum and natural 
gas industry.” Id. 
 212 “This specification defines minimal requirements for the design of valves, 
wellheads and Christmas tree equipment that is used during drilling and production 
operations.” Id. at 14-15. 
 213 “This specification provides minimum requirements and guidelines for packers 
and bridge plugs used downhole in oil and gas operations.” Id. at 15. 
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Equipment;214API Specification 16C — Specification for Choke and 
Kill Systems;215API Specification 16D — Specification for Control 
Systems for Drilling Well Control Equipment and Control Systems for 
Diverter Equipment;216ANSI/API Specification 17D — Design and 
Operation of Subsea Production Systems — Subsea Wellhead and Tree 
Equipment;217 and API Recommended Practice 17H — Remotely 
Operated Tools and Interfaces on Subsea Production Systems.218 
In addition to its incorporation of API standards, the proposed rule 
also references the importance of stakeholder participation. For 
instance, the proposed rule indicates that the BSEE recognized that it 
was important to collect the best ideas on the prevention of well-
control incidents and blowouts to assist in the development of this 
proposed rule. The rule explicitly states that these ideas “include the 
knowledge and skillset that industry has, and BSEE wants to benefit 
from that experience to improve the safety of all operations on the 
OCS.”219 To that end, the “BSEE hosted a public offshore energy 
forum that brought together Federal decision-makers, industry, 
academia, and other stakeholders to discuss additional steps that BSEE 
and the industry might take to continue to improve the reliability and 
safety of BOPs” and “[d]iscussion panels consisted of representatives 
from government organizations, trade associations, equipment 
manufacturers, offshore operators, consultants, training companies, 
 
 214 “This specification defines requirements for performance, design, materials, 
testing and inspection, welding, marking, handling, storing and shipping of BOPs and 
drill-through equipment used for drilling for oil and gas.” Id. 
 215 “This specification was formulated to provide for safe and functionally 
interchangeable surface and subsea choke and kill systems equipment utilized for 
drilling oil and gas wells.” Id. at 16. 
 216 “This specification establishes design standards for systems that are used to 
control BOPs and associated valves that control well pressure during drilling 
operations.” Id. at 17. 
 217 “This specification provides specifications for subsea wellheads, mudline 
wellheads, drill-through mudline wellheads and both vertical and horizontal subsea 
trees.” Id. at 17-18. 
 218 “This recommended practice has been prepared to provide general 
recommendations and overall guidance for the design and operation of remotely 
operated tools (ROT) comprising ROT and ROV tooling used on offshore subsea 
systems. ROT and ROV performance is critical to ensuring safe and reliable deepwater 
operations and this document provides general performance guidelines for the 
equipment.” Id. at 18. The proposed rule also mentions incorporation of standards in 
the copyright context, noting that “[w]hen a copyrighted technical industry standard 
is incorporated by reference into our regulations, BSEE is obligated to observe and 
protect that copyright.” Id. at 11.  
 219 Id. at 22. 
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and others.”220 Finally, the proposed rule notes that “in several 
sections of the proposed regulations, BSEE would require third-party 
verification of the design, maintenance, inspection, testing, and repair 
of BOP systems and equipment by a BSEE-approved entity.”221 
Although the Arctic Council documents reference collaboration 
much more directly than the U.S. regulations do, the domestic 
regulatory incorporation of specific API standards and Arctic Council 
agreements helps to harmonize safety efforts across institutions in 
important ways. This form of regulation does, however, have its limits. 
Under U.S. law, some types of regulatory incorporation — particularly 
ones that allow private institutions to write standards directly rather 
than ones like these in which the government uses specific privately-
created standards — will run up against constitutional constraints.222 
More broadly, as discussed in more depth in Section III.D, public 
institutions will have to be careful that privately created standards 
actually serve the public interest. And the types of cooperation among 
entities included in both the Arctic Council and U.S. regulatory efforts 
do not always translate into more than surface inclusion.223 Despite 
these limits, though, these three examples demonstrate the ways in 
which fragmented institutions are bringing their efforts together in 
written documents that guide them. 
 
 220 Id. at 22-23. 
 221 Id. at 29. 
 222 See Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.Rs., 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1231 (2015) 
(clarifying the constitutional limits on delegation to private entities); see also Jody 
Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 581, 584-85 
(2000) (“[T]he federal government thus retains considerable flexibility to make 
substantial delegations of its responsibilities, and even of functions closely associated 
with core sovereign powers, to private parties . . . . To enforce the nondelegation 
doctrine using the traditional rationale would require the Court first to find that core 
governmental functions do exist and then to distinguish them from peripheral 
functions in a principled way, which would be a rather formalistic undertaking.”). For 
analysis of ways in which governmental agencies increasingly contract out traditional 
functions to private entities, see Jody Freeman, The Contracting State, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 155, 155-214 (2000).  
 223 See infra Part III.D. Peter Strauss has explored the transparency and intellectual 
property concerns that can arise when government incorporates private standards. See 
Peter Strauss, Incorporating by Reference: Knowing the Law in the Electronic Age, 39 
ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS 36, 36 (2014) (analyzing the implications of a change in 
regulations governing “incorporation by reference”); Peter Strauss, Private Standards 
Organizations and Public Law, 22 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J., 497, 518-37 (2013) 
(exploring issues with the Office of the Federal Register’s approach to incorporation 
by reference). 
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C. Institutional Collaboration 
Emerging hybrid cooperation in the Arctic is not simply taking place 
through agreements, guidelines, and regulations. New institutional 
forms are developing that help bring together key stakeholders, and 
other more long-standing ones also have a role to play in offshore oil 
and gas safety as drilling moves forward. This Section explores three 
examples of collaboration through institutions: Arctic Inupiat 
Offshore, LLC (“AIO”); Regional Citizens Advisory Councils; and the 
Arctic Waterways Safety Committee. 
1. Arctic Inupiat Offshore, LLC 
The Arctic Inupiat Offshore, LLC provides a particularly interesting 
example of cooperation in this context because it involves two sets of 
key stakeholders not always included fully in Arctic Council and 
governmental regulatory efforts — a transnational oil corporation and 
Alaska Native corporations. In July 2014, 
Arctic Slope Regional Corporation (ASRC) and six (6) North 
Slope village corporations . . . joined together to create a new 
company known as the Arctic Inupiat Offshore, LLC (AIO). 
AIO and Shell Gulf of Mexico Inc. (Shell) . . . entered into a 
binding agreement that will allow AIO the option to acquire an 
interest in Shell’s acreage and activities on its Chukchi Sea 
leases. This interest will be managed by AIO.224 
According to the agreement, Shell will assign to AIO an overriding 
royalty interest in oil and gas produced from specific Chukchi Sea 
leases. AIO also would have the option to participate in project 
activities by acquiring a working interest at the time Shell makes the 
decision to proceed with development and production. In addition, 
“Shell and AIO will hold quarterly meetings to exchange information 
and address regional and development issues.”225 Although Shell Oil 
has indicated that it will not pursue Chukchi Sea drilling for the 
foreseeable future, limiting the current practical impact of the 
agreement, it serves as an interesting example of hybrid cooperation. 
Unlike the co-management governance arrangements that were put 
into place following the land claims agreements in Alaska,226 AIO is a 
 
 224 ASRC Press Release, supra note 179. 
 225 Id. 
 226 For an expanded discussion of Arctic co-management with a particular focus on 
the whaling context, see Jessica M. Shadian, Of Whales and Oil: Inuit Resource 
  
1496 University of California, Davis [Vol. 49:1431 
direct collaboration with industry without government oversight, 
intervention, or mandate. Thus, Alaska Native corporations not only gain 
economically from industry profit, but they are also partners with 
industry in the exploration and development of its oil and gas in that area. 
According to Ukpeaġik Inupiat Corporation president and CEO, Anthony 
E. Edwardsen, who was designated to serve as Chairman of AIO, 
Our values teach us that we achieve success by putting the 
needs of our community at the center of all that we do. It is 
important that our community has a seat at the table to 
represent the subsistence and economic needs of our 
shareholders. Through AIO we will have meaningful input 
into this process while providing benefits back to our 
shareholders.227 
More specifically, according to Olgoonik Corporation, the AIO-Shell 
agreement aimed at accomplishing four particular goals for the Alaska 
Native corporations participating.  
Creating Alignment 
Together, we will work to advocate for best practices from 
Shell to ensure the subsistence and economic needs of our 
people are addressed. 
A Seat at the Table 
This agreement gives us a strong, unified position on 
development and subsistence matters — we are active 
participants in the decisions impacting our communities. 
Planning our Future 
OCS development is occurring. This investment allows us 
to . . . share in the rewards, and not just the risks, of OCS 
development. 
Economic Stability 
Responsible resource development translates into economic 
resources — sustainable employment and contracting 
opportunities for our people and region.228 
 
Governance and the Arctic Council, 49 POLAR REC. 392, 394-99 (2013).  
 227 ASRC Press Release, supra note 179.  
 228 AIO Quick Facts, OLGOONIK, http://www.olgoonik.com/arctic-inupiat-offshore 
(last visited Feb. 23, 2016). 
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This view of the agreement as creating an opportunity for multi-
stakeholder interaction is not simply held by the Alaska Native 
participants. Pete Slaiby, vice president of Shell Alaska at the time of 
the agreement, explained that: “The agreement is about more than 
spreading the benefits of offshore development. It’s really about what 
it’s going to take to move us forward collaboratively. And it will take 
all of us working together to move us forward in the Arctic.”229 Or as 
Rex A. Rock, Sr., ASRC president and chief executive officer who will 
also serve as president of AIO put it: “this arrangement balances the 
risk of OCS development borne by our coastal communities with the 
benefits intended to support our communities and our people.”230 
Although this agreement did not include state or federal 
governmental entities directly, elected officials praised the joint 
venture. Alaska Gov. Sean Parnell lauded the creation of AIO and said 
“Shell’s partnership with the Alaska Native corporations that will 
provide a greater voice and opportunity for the people in the region 
and a seat at the development table.”231 U.S. Sen. Lisa Murkowski, R-
Alaska, conveyed a similar sentiment: “This announcement ensures 
that the people of the North Slope Borough share directly in the oil 
and gas bounty off of their coast. It gives locals a say in what happens 
near their communities. I think that’s a wise decision on Shell’s 
part.”232 Although the Shell Oil pullout prevents an analysis in the 
near term of how the agreement will play out in practice in the 
management of offshore drilling in the Chukchi Sea, its approach and 
the reactions of leaders to it suggest that it serves as a promising 
model for the future. 
 
 229 Yereth Rosen, Shell, Native Corporations Unveil Joint Venture in Chukchi Sea 
Leases, ARCTIC NEWSWIRE (July 31, 2014), http://www.adn.com/article/20140731/shell-
native-corporations-unveil-joint-venture-chukchi-sea-leases. 
 230 Kristen Nelson, ASRC, Shell Form JV: Arctic Slope Regional Corp., 6 North Slope 
Village Corporations, Create AIO, PETROLEUM NEWS (Aug. 10, 2014), http://www. 
petroleumnews.com/pntruncate/798469612.shtml. 
 231 Id. He added that: “This establishes a very positive precedent in Alaska’s Outer 
Continental Shelf, showing strategic partnership among North Slope communities and 
Shell, both of which understand the importance of developing Alaska’s offshore oil 
and gas resources.” Id. 
 232 Id. U.S. Sen. Mark Begich, D-Alaska, similarly expressed his excitement over 
seeing Alaska Native corporations “take a stake in responsible development in their 
backyard.” Id. He said “it’s good to see Shell partner with local communities and 
corporations. Hopefully, we’ll see this partnership pay off in the very near future.” Id. 
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2. Regional Citizens Advisory Councils 
Unlike the new collaborations described in the sections that precede 
and follow this one, RCACs have been a fixture in Alaska since soon 
after the Exxon Valdez oil spill.233 Although they, like the Arctic 
Waterways Safety Committee described in the following section, are 
focused on waterway safety and pollution and thus primarily relevant 
to the shipping aspect of offshore drilling, their longer tenure provides 
an opportunity to assess the possibilities and limitations of multi-
stakeholder institutions in fostering collaboration.234 
In the aftermath of the Exxon Valdez spill, there were calls for a 
broader set of stakeholders to participate in decision-making around oil 
tanker safety and spill management. The Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 
which was passed in response to the spill, attempted to address that 
concern by providing a statutory basis for two RCACs, one in the Prince 
William Sound region and the other in the Cook Inlet region. The 
statute included guidelines for their membership to include key diverse 
constituencies. A settlement with Exxon helped to fund them.235 
 
 233 See NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL & OFFSHORE 
DRILLING, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, DEEP WATER: THE GULF OIL DISASTER AND THE 
FUTURE OF OFFSHORE DRILLING 268-69 (2011) [hereinafter NAT’L COMM’N REPORT]; 
Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Learning from Disasters: Twenty-One Years After the Exxon Valdez 
Oil Spill, Will Reactions to the Deepwater Horizon Blowout Finally Address the Systemic 
Flaws Revealed in Alaska?, 40 ENVTL. L. REP. 11041, 11045-46 (2010) [hereinafter 
Learning from Disasters], available at http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/cgi/ 
viewcontent.cgi?article=1327&context=lsfp (citing Jim Carlton, Bill Includes Citizens 
Oil Panel for Gulf, Arctic Coasts, WALL ST. J. ONLINE (Aug. 2, 2010), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703292704575393492820269842); 
Harlan Kirgan, Biloxi Beach Event to Call for Citizen Group to Monitor Oil and Gas 
Activities in Gulf of Mexico, GULFLIVE.COM (June 24, 2011, 6:56 AM), http:// 
blog.gulflive.com/mississippi-press-news/2011/06/biloxi_beach_event_to_call_for.html. 
 234 This section draws from prior work of Hari Osofsky on RCACs, at times in 
collaboration with Hannah Wiseman. See Osofsky & Wiseman, supra note 175, at 20-
31; Osofsky, Multidimensional Governance, supra note 32, at 1127-28. However, it 
provides original analysis of them in the context of emerging offshore Arctic drilling. 
 235 See Plater, Learning from Disasters, supra note 233, at 11046 (citing Oil 
Pollution Act of 1990, 33 U.S.C. § 2732(d) (2006)); see also Zygmunt J.B. Plater, 
Facing a Time of Counter-Revolution — The Kepone Incident and a Review of First 
Principles, 29 U. RICH. L. REV. 657, 700-01 (1995) [hereinafter The Kepone Incident]; 
William H. Rodgers, Jr., The Most Creative Moments in the History of Environmental 
Law: “The Whats,” 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 22-23; George Busenberg, Citizen Advisory 
Councils and Environmental Management in the Marine Oil Trade 32 (1997) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.circac.org/wp-content/ 
uploads/CACEnvironMg.pdf (studying the two advisory councils’ impacts on policy 
change); About Us, supra note 136; Who We Are, COOK INLET REGIONAL CITIZENS 
ADVISORY COUNCIL, http://www.circac.org/who-we-are (last visited Apr. 22, 2012).  
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The Cook Inlet RCAC includes thirteen members from local 
governments, Alaska Native groups, and others harmed by the Exxon 
Valdez spill. It has worked on improving spill prevention and response 
for the Inlet, including water pollution monitoring. The Prince 
William Sound RCAC also involves multiple stakeholders with a 
similar focus. However, its structure is somewhat different. Although 
it was created through the OPA, this RCAC has funding from and a 
contractual relationship with the Alyeska Pipeline Service Company, 
which operates the Valdez terminal and the trans-Alaska pipeline.236 
Both RCACs have been involved in a number of oil spill response 
research initiatives.237 
Assessments of the RCACs’ work indicate that these types of 
institutions can serve as an important form of hybrid cooperation. For 
instance Professor George Busenberg’s study of them explains that: 
“the councils have operated as institutional learning arrangements (by 
promoting the application of new ideas and information to policy 
decisions in this system).”238 His study suggests that the RCAC’s 
capacities varied based on their funding, but that each of them 
influenced policy through their own work and through collaborations 
with other institutions.239 
Others have raised concerns with RCACs that potentially apply to 
the other institutional arrangements discussed in this Part as well. In 
particular, Zygmunt Plater has criticized RCACs’ lack of subpoena 
power and the dependence on annual funds negotiations with 
industry, as well as co-opting of board members.240 Especially because 
 
 236 See Plater, Learning from Disasters, supra note 233, at 11046; see also Plater, The 
Kepone Incident, supra note 235 at 700-01; Rodgers, supra note 235, at 22-23; 
Busenberg, supra note 235, at 32; About Us, supra note 136; Who We Are, supra note 
235; History of the Council, PRINCE WILLIAM SOUND REGIONAL CITIZENS’ ADVISORY 
COUNCIL, http://www.pwsrcac.org/about/history/ (last visited Apr. 22, 2012). 
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so many of the entities and rules discussed are drawing from efforts by 
interested corporations, they are at some risk of regulatory capture (in 
which private interests overtake public ones). While these limitations 
do exist, RCACs serve as an important example of the ways in which 
institutional innovation can provide important spaces for key 
stakeholders to collaborate. 
3. Arctic Waterways Safety Committee 
Arctic offshore drilling developments are expected to result in 
increased use of the waterways. The U.S. Committee on the Maritime 
Transportation System’s report, A 10-Year Projection Of Maritime 
Activity in the U.S. Arctic Region, indicates for example that: 
The preliminary revised draft OCS exploration plan submitted 
by Shell to the U.S. Bureau of Ocean Energy Management 
(BOEM) lists the vessels and the expected activity for the 
proposed exploration. Many of the 22 support vessels such as 
tugs, anchor handlers, and ice management vessels would 
remain near the drill ship, contributing to on-site activity. 
However, offshore supply vessels are anticipated to make up to 
30 round trips to Kotzebue and/or Dutch Harbor.241 
While Arctic offshore drilling provides an opportunity for economic 
development and greater energy independence, the increased usage of 
Arctic waterways raises a number of concerns for the variety of 
stakeholders who make daily use of and rely on these waterways for 
other activities. 
For example, many communities in the OCS depend upon a 
subsistence lifestyle. George Noongwook is a whaling captain from 
Savoonga, Alaska, Chair of the Alaska Eskimo Whaling Commission, 
and also an alternate Chair of the Arctic Waterways Safety Committee 
(“AWSC”). Mr. Noongwook explains, “We don’t get much food from 
the store. We get most of our food from the ocean — whales, walrus, 
and fish. This is how we feed our children, our families, and our 
elders.”242 Maintaining a subsistence lifestyle in the face of the 
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anticipated growth in maritime travel is a principal concern for many 
communities.243 
To address these concerns “the AWSC was established in October 
2014 as a self-governing multi-stakeholder group focused on creating 
or documenting best practices to ensure a safe, efficient, and 
predictable operating environment for all users of the arctic 
waterways.”244 Committee members are a wide array of Arctic 
maritime users and stakeholders and “fall under three categories: 
Subsistence Hunters, Industry, and Other representatives. Each 
category has five seats, each with a vote in decisions made by the 
organization.”245 Committee members include Mr. Noongwook with 
whaling expertise and an understanding of traditional knowledge, 
advocacy group representatives, mayors, “offshore oil and gas 
developers, and tug and barge operators.”246 
“The mission of the AWSC is to provide a proactive forum for 
identifying, assessing, planning, communicating, and implementing 
measures that enhance safe, secure, efficient and environmentally sound 
maritime operations in the U.S. Arctic waters.”247 The committee’s 
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purpose is to “bring together local marine interests in the Alaskan Arctic 
in a single forum, and to act collectively on behalf of those interests to 
develop best practices to ensure a safe, efficient, and predictable 
operating environment for all current and future users of the 
waterway.”248 Its focus is to ensure “communication between members, 
improving the safety of the Arctic Maritime Transportation System, and 
generating consensus between AWSC members on issues impacting the 
Arctic Maritime Transportation System.”249 According to AWSC Bylaws, 
these goals will be achieved by “[f]acilitat[ing] the continued safe and 
efficient economic development, commerce, and subsistence practices 
that are vital to local economies” and “[a]ct[ing] as a resource at the 
request of governmental bodies and individual legislators regarding 
issues related to marine operational and environmental safety.”250 
Ultimately, AWSC will create best management plans that address the 
diverse interests in Arctic waterways. 
Most relevant for this Article, the AWSC aims to balance the diverse 
interests in the Arctic waterways in the face of increased maritime 
travel, due in part to Arctic offshore drilling. “This committee would 
give various stakeholders a forum to solve differences in the Arctic 
waterways without involving regulatory intervention from federal 
authorities therefore avoiding a drawn out bureaucratic process.”251 
The Prevention Division of the U.S. Coast Guard initiated the 
formation of the AWSC by holding the first meeting with 
representatives from a number of different stakeholder groups. The 
idea came from similar committees developed in Puget Sound, 
Washington, Los Angeles, California, and southeast Texas.252 While 
the U.S. Coast Guard envisioned the AWSC and helped with the 
formation, the AWSC is now an independently functioning institution. 
The first formal meeting was held in March 2015 in Juneau and the 
second took place in June 2015 at the Dena’ina Center in Anchorage. 
All meetings are open to the public.253 From the start, the AWSC has 
sought to involve a broad range of stakeholders: “While the Coast 
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Guard is providing a framework for this maritime committee, the 
committee will be established based solely on the collective group of 
stakeholders to include representatives from local and tribal 
governments, subsistence hunter co-management groups, advocacy 
organizations, the maritime industry and community members.”254 
The AWSC is already communicating concerns over the changing 
conditions of the Arctic waterways and the need for balancing diverse 
interests with politicians. For example, the AWSC met with Senator 
Donald Olson to convey the need for and emerging collaboration 
between locals and new economic interests that are coming in.255 
Although the AWSC only addresses one aspect of offshore drilling 
risks — those created by vessel transport — its institutional structure 
and approach provides another example of hybrid cooperation. Like 
the agreements more specific to offshore oil and gas safety emerging 
from the Arctic Council and the other institutions described in this 
Part, the AWSC provides mechanisms for needed interaction crucial to 
multi-stakeholder cooperation. 
At the same time, although all three institutions represent 
innovative institutional mechanisms for creating hybrid cooperation, 
fragmentation remains between these institutions and other aspects of 
Arctic regional governance. For example, these institutions are not 
integrated into the Arctic Council’s efforts (for example, the 
establishment of the Arctic Coast Guard Forum in October 2015) to 
include stakeholders as it shapes regional policies for Arctic offshore 
oil and gas development.256 In addition, while it seems likely that the 
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AWSC, like the RCACs, will have influence over time in some of the 
same ways Busenberg noted in that context, a key question regarding 
both sets of institutions, however, is whether they will effect U.S. 
domestic policy or Arctic regional policy more broadly. And, as 
explored more in the next section, all three of the institutions face 
risks of private capture — particularly the AIO-Shell Oil collaboration 
(or future collaborations framed similarly) with its economic 
development orientation and corporate involvement.257 
D. Benefits and Limitations of Hybrid Cooperation 
The implicit and explicit cooperation analyzed in this Part 
represents only a small fraction of the governance efforts taking place 
around Arctic offshore drilling. The Part focuses on the U.S. context 
and a representative selection of regulatory and institutional 
developments. But these agreements, rules, and institutions serve as 
helpful examples for evaluating mechanisms for achieving greater 
harmonization and inclusion of key stakeholders in this complex 
regulatory environment. 
This Section’s assessment builds on the prior work of Hari Osofsky 
and Hannah Wiseman in Hybrid Energy Governance evaluating the 
success of hybrid institutions in the broader U.S. energy governance 
context.258 That Article suggests that evaluations of the success or 
failure of governance innovation should focus on both substantive and 
structural aspects. In other words, assessment should include whether 
governance innovation achieves the goals that it was set up to 
accomplish substantively and addresses underlying governance 
problems in the process.259 Translating that idea into this context, we 
ask: Do these examples (1) substantively have the potential to make 
offshore drilling safer and (2) structurally address the governance 
problems identified in Part II and help to develop regional Arctic 
energy governance? Our answer to both of these questions is a 
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tentative “yes,” with the caveat that most of these regulations and 
institutions are too new to yield clear results. 
1. Substantive Assessment 
With respect to offshore drilling safety, each of the examples has the 
potential to help with spill prevention and/or response, but they have 
not been fully tested due to how new they are and the limited U.S. 
Arctic offshore drilling to date. With respect to the regulations, as this 
section explores, the Arctic Council’s 2015 Framework Plan for 
Cooperation on Prevention of Oil Pollution and Offshore Oil and Gas 
Guidelines and the U.S. federal regulations implement some of the 
recommendations of the National Commission on the Deepwater 
Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling in the ways in which they frame 
the governmental-corporate interactions and bring together different 
types of standards. The institutions similarly provide opportunities for 
substantive progress through the processes they create among key 
stakeholders. Although neither of these qualities guarantee better 
drilling safety, they are both promising as explored below.260 
The Arctic Council’s 2015 Framework Plan, as described in Section 
III.B.1, contains specific language about relevant collaboration with 
industry, but by its nature, does not fill in the details. However, the 
2014 Offshore Guidelines are far more specific, and seem designed to 
address some of the safety culture problems that led to the BP 
Deepwater Horizon spill. In particular, the National Commission on 
that spill found that systemic regulatory failures caused the spill, and 
proposed a consideration of a more “proactive, risk-based performance 
approach” modeled on the “safety case” strategy used in the North 
Sea.261 The 2014 Guidelines’ inclusion of specific provisions on safety 
culture provides an opportunity to test this recommendation in the 
Arctic context. Moreover, the Guidelines’ delineation of safety 
management categories that include industry-regulatory interaction 
and a role for indigenous peoples and their knowledge has the 
potential to help harmonize safety efforts across nation-states and 
corporate and indigenous stakeholders.262 The new U.S. regulatory 
efforts regarding Arctic offshore drilling and blowout preventers 
similarly implement the Commission’s recommendation to update 
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regulation, and do so in a way that reflects both governmental and 
industry efforts in the aftermath of the 2010 spill.263 
The three institutions described in Section III.C — AIO, RCACs, and 
AWSC — each have the potential to advance safety (with that potential 
somewhat realized in the more long-standing RCACs) through the way in 
which they involve key stakeholders in decision-making related to safety. 
AIO focuses on shared economic benefits for indigenous peoples by 
bringing Alaska Native corporations to the table as full participants. AIO 
was also structured to provide an opportunity for them to help shape the 
development in ways that could lessen risk of harm to Alaska Native 
communities.264 The RCACs, through their decades of experiment and 
assessment, have brought key stakeholders together to produce 
recommendations about how to limit risks.265 Finally, AWSC already 
seems to be making constructive interventions on various aspects of 
transportation safety.266 
Despite these indicators of these institutions’ capacity to contribute 
to spill prevention and response, it remains unclear how each of them 
will cooperate with more formal channels of policy such as BSEE at a 
U.S. federal level and the Arctic Council at a regional level. Such 
interconnection is important to ensuring that their efforts and aims are 
carried through into practice. In order for them to be maximally 
effective, their institutional collaboration should help foster the other 
form of hybrid cooperation, regulatory incorporation, with their work 
being brought into the formal structures and soft law standards for 
Arctic offshore energy governance. Overall, while only time will tell if 
the newer regulatory and institutional innovations described in this 
Part will realize their promise, they seem designed to address 
important safety concerns in the way in which they harmonize efforts 
among key stakeholders. 
2. Structural Assessment 
With the same caveat as in the previous section that it is too early to 
know how these developments will play out over time, the examples 
of hybrid cooperation that this Part explores all seem to decrease the 
fragmentation analyzed in Part II. Each of them brings together key 
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stakeholders and regulatory approaches in ways that make Arctic 
offshore drilling governance more coherent. 
When the Arctic Council and U.S. federal government use standards 
created by transnational industry and standard-setting entities, they 
ensure that corporations engaging in offshore drilling have a clear and 
consistent set of standards to follow.267 This harmonization — so long 
as the standards are well designed and appropriate — helps reduce 
costs, improve safety, and decrease confusion. 
Similarly, when key stakeholders work together in institutions like 
the AIO, RCACs, and AWSC, they create a coherency across the 
diversity of participants in different aspects of Arctic offshore drilling. 
The more well-established RCACs provide an example of this 
structural inclusion of stakeholders leading to harmonized 
approaches.268 
However, for both types of hybrid cooperation, there is a risk that 
private and public interests may not align (or have equal enough 
financial means for stakeholders to represent their interests 
sufficiently).269 When industry-developed standards are used and 
corporate participants are included, their know-how can be 
incorporated, but as noted above in the discussion of the specific 
examples, a risk of regulatory capture exists. Participation in 
regulatory development and emerging institutions needs to be assessed 
over time to make sure that their processes include all stakeholders in 
a meaningful way. 
Specifically, stakeholder participation should amount to real input 
into regulatory processes (not merely symbolic forms of consultation 
carried out to meet regulatory demands). Multi-stakeholder processes 
in institutions do not always translate into regulatory or project input, 
which increases the risk that resulting standards will be dominated by 
the most powerful special interests, in this case oil and gas industry 
ones.270 For example, a number of Alaskan Inupiat politicians, 
aboriginal consultants and academics have raised the concern that U.S. 
and Canadian consultation processes with indigenous peoples are 
often burdensome without having clear influence on the resulting 
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regulations. They argue for further assessment of these processes’ 
influence.271 Similar assessments are needed with respect to this 
Article’s case studies. 
However, despite these limitations, the examples of hybrid 
cooperation explored in this Article have the potential to help address 
safety and governance concerns in needed ways. They are certainly not 
a panacea, but they serve as important and promising developments in 
the complex and emerging regulatory governance of Arctic offshore 
drilling. The conclusion that follows considers whether these 
instances of hybrid cooperation, when combined, have the potential to 
evolve into or assist the development of a more integrated regional 
Arctic offshore oil and gas governance system. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has three core conclusions about the current state of 
and future possibilities for energy governance in the Arctic. First, the 
complex, multilevel, multi-actor regulatory efforts in the context of 
Arctic offshore drilling create a major regulatory challenge. Arctic 
offshore drilling safety is hard to address fully through treaties and 
national regulations because many key stakeholders are taking 
measures to address safety that are not fully captured in those 
processes.272 
Second, Arctic Council agreements, U.S. federal laws, and emerging 
Arctic institutions at multiple levels are bringing these diverse streams 
together. Hybrid collaboration is emerging across governance scales, 
with different variations of the public and private stakeholders it 
includes. This Article’s case studies provide examples of some of the 
forms that such convergence can take. Although they range from the 
U.S. federal government incorporating standards created by 
transnational industry and standard-setting bodies to Alaska Native 
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corporations cooperating with a multi-national oil and gas 
corporation, they all have a core function in common. These efforts at 
regulatory incorporation and new institutional collaborations are 
decreasing fragmentation in ways that have the potential to make 
Arctic offshore drilling safer.273 
Third, despite these promising examples of hybrid cooperation, a 
major challenge remains for achieving coherent regional governance of 
offshore drilling. It is unclear whether this mosaic of emerging 
regulatory and institutional interconnections will be adequate to bring 
together key actors and initiatives. Arctic Council efforts, for example, 
do not yet integrate those of RCACs or of the more recently created 
AIO and AWSC. The experiences of the Exxon Valdez and BP 
Deepwater Horizon spill indicate, though, that such integration could 
serve a critical role for local communities who have served and would 
like to serve as first responders274 and have traditional knowledge that 
could assist with detecting and monitoring environmental changes.275 
Greater regional coherence is also needed because a major oil spill in 
the Arctic would likely have transboundary impacts due to the 
physical geography of its seas, broader ocean, and coastline and the 
proximity of drill sites to national borders.276 
In the final analysis, the efforts at regulatory integration and 
institutional collaboration analyzed in this Article may collectively 
serve to plant the seeds of more coherent Arctic energy governance. 
These iterations of cooperation in and among a variety of institutions 
are helping to develop new norms for how to operate in the Arctic. 
For example, regional and national governance bodies incorporate 
parallel government standards while key actors from those public 
institutions interact with multi-stakeholder bodies that are working 
towards better protocols. Further research is needed into how these 
norms are established and then reified through formal policy, 
especially as the newer regulations are tested and institutions mature. 
Moreover, this concept of hybrid cooperation has possibilities for 
understanding emerging governance in other complex areas with 
significant regulatory and institutional overlap, such as humanitarian 
crisis management, transnational investment, and climate change. 
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Effective governance in this context is challenging, and existing and 
nascent institutional structures are trying to respond to that challenge. 
Even if these instances of hybrid cooperation are not comprehensive 
enough to include all key stakeholders or address all fragmentation, 
they serve as an important example of possible pathways forward in 
this context and other complex governance contexts. If multiple 
institutions can create needed interweaving of regulation and 
stakeholders, they can develop a web of collaboration that is itself 
hybrid and can constructively address governance concerns. 
